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REASSESSING THE CITIZENS
PROTECTION ACT:
A GOOD THING IT PASSED, AND A GOOD
THING IT FAILED
Rima Sirota*
INTRODUCTION

Critics have lambasted the Citizens Protection Act of 1998 (the CPA)1
from all ideological perspectives.2 The criticism began at the earliest stages
of the legislative debate and continues through the present. With the
advantage of fifteen years hindsight, this article demonstrates that the CPA
succeeded where it should have and failed where it should have. The CPA
has left us—even if inadvertently—with a remarkably coherent and
consistent approach to regulating a federal prosecutor’s ability to effectively

* Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law Center; previously
Attorney Advisor, U.S. Dept. of Justice Professional Responsibility Advisory Office. I extend my
thanks to Julie Ross, Jeffrey Shulman, Kristen Tiscione, Julie O’Sullivan, Patricia Weiss, and
Anita Gay for their comments and encouragement and to Sarah Scott for her excellent research
assistance.
1. The CPA is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006). Although the bill entitled “The
Citizens Protection Act” was an earlier version of the bill that was ultimately enacted, the law is
still commonly referred to by that name. See Megan Browdie & Wei Xiang, Current
Development, Chevron Protects Citizens: Reviving the Citizens Protection Act, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 695, 695-96 & n.8 (2009). The law is also sometimes referred to as the “McDade
Amendment,” after Rep. Joseph McDade, its chief Congressional sponsor. See James F.
Holderman & Charles B. Redfern, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System
Revisited, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 527, 530 n.16 (2006).
2. Compare, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2001) (criticizing the CPA for failing to rein in
prosecutorial misconduct), and Browdie & Xiang, supra note 1, at 696 (same), with Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797,
816-17 (2009) (criticizing the CPA for creating an unsettled legal landscape that chills federal
prosecutors’ willingness and ability to fully engage in criminal investigations), and Peter J.
Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1999)
(same).
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direct and participate in criminal investigations regardless of whether the
suspect is represented by counsel early in the proceedings.
The legislative debate over the CPA focused on two questions. First,
may a federal prosecutor communicate with, or direct others to
communicate with, a suspect in a criminal investigation if the suspect is
represented by a lawyer? And second, should the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) be able to decide this issue for its own lawyers?
To put the issue in context, consider the following typical scenario:
DOJ is investigating a person suspected of involvement in a string of
burglaries. The suspect is aware of the investigation and has retained a
lawyer. The federal prosecutor assigned to the matter directs a cooperating
witness to initiate and record conversations with the suspect about the
burglaries. The suspect’s lawyer knows nothing about the conversations.
The suspect makes incriminating statements to the cooperating witness.
The suspect is subsequently charged, his recorded statements are introduced
at trial, and he is convicted.3
No statute or constitutional provision prohibits the prosecutor’s
conduct in this situation. The only potentially relevant prohibition is the
“no-contact” rule of professional conduct, adopted in every state, which
generally prohibits a lawyer in a matter from communicating with, or
directing others to communicate with, the client of another lawyer in the
matter.4
The CPA required federal prosecutors to conform to state rules of
professional conduct “to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State.”5 Congress intended the CPA to nullify DOJ’s
claimed authority to exempt federal prosecutors from most constraints of
the no-contact rule in criminal investigations.6 The CPA accomplished this
goal. Congress also, however, intended the CPA to lodge authority over the
no-contact rule issue with state authorities which, it was assumed, would
interpret the rule in a manner that would substantially constrain federal
prosecutors’ ability to participate in the scenario described above.7 The
CPA did not accomplish this goal.
This mixed record of success and failure has resulted in our current
effective system of no-contact rule regulation for federal prosecutors. To

3. This factual scenario was adapted from United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 94547 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which was the first federal appellate decision to directly address this
question. See infra Part I.B.1.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
6. See, e.g., Browdie & Xiang, supra note 1, at 709.
7. See, e.g., Hazard & Irwin, supra note 2, at 809-10.
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demonstrate why and how this is so, this article analyzes each critical step
up to, and including passage of, the CPA, beginning in Part I with the nocontact rule itself. Because the CPA was intended to bind federal
prosecutors to the rule in the same way as private civil lawyers are bound,
Part I demonstrates how the rule operates in the civil context and then
examines the development in federal courts of what I have termed the “precharge investigatory exemption,” which permits prosecutorial
communications with persons who are represented by counsel but who have
not yet been charged with a crime.8 Finally, Part I examines United States
v. Hammad, which, for the first time among federal courts, held that precharge investigatory communications could violate the rule.9
Part II examines the “Thornburgh Memo”10 and the “Reno
Regulation,”11 which together comprised DOJ’s reaction to Hammad. The
Memo and the Regulation asserted that DOJ had exclusive authority to
interpret and enforce the no-contact rule for its lawyers and that the nocontact rule had minimal application to the work of federal prosecutors.
Part II demonstrates that the Memo and the Regulation were unnecessary as
a practical matter and also unwise as a tactical matter—leading as they did
to the CPA, which DOJ bitterly opposed.
Part III examines the legislative debate leading to the CPA and
demonstrates that both sides of that debate assumed that the new law would
substantially limit the broad pre-charge investigatory exemption for federal
prosecutors. Through an examination of post-CPA court decisions, Part III
then demonstrates how and why these shared expectations proved to be so
incorrect.
Part IV examines how scholarship regarding the CPA has focused on
fixing the problems that the CPA is alleged to have wrought or—depending
on the scholar’s perspective—is alleged to have failed to fix. Part IV
concludes that it is a good thing the CPA passed because DOJ’s claim of
8. The reference to “pre-charge investigatory” communications is intended to be broadly
inclusive of communications with represented persons prior to arrest, indictment, or other
adversarial charging event. See generally Frank O. Bowman, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name:
The Misuse of ‘Ethical Rules’ Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 665, 734-35 & n.339 (1996).
9. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1988).
10. See Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General, to All Justice Department
Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93 (D.N.M. 1992)
[hereinafter Thornburgh Memo].
11. See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (Aug. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter Reno Regulation]. The Reno Regulation was codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-77.5
(1995), but was superseded in 1999 by new regulations consistent with the Citizens Protection
Act, see Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,273 (April 20,
1999), codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-77.5 (2013).
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authority over the no-contact rule would inevitably have undermined public
confidence in federal prosecutors’ commitment to fair and ethical
investigatory processes. By the same token, it is a good thing that the CPA
failed to narrow the parameters of the pre-charge investigatory exemption
because depriving federal prosecutors of this essential tool—or disciplining
them for using it—would have substantially hindered otherwise-legitimate
criminal investigations for no good reason.
I.

THE NO-CONTACT RULE

The debate over the Citizens Protection Act was framed primarily
around the no-contact rule. Every American jurisdiction has adopted such a
provision, most of which mirror the American Bar Association’s Model
Rule 4.2:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
12
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

The no-contact rule dates back more than a century, and its basic
thrust—prohibiting a lawyer in a matter from communicating with persons
represented by another lawyer in the matter—has changed little over time.13
A. The No-Contact Rule for “Other Attorneys in that State”
The CPA requires federal prosecutors to adhere to the no-contact rule
“to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that
State.”14 The phrase “other attorneys” was generally taken to mean private
lawyers, probably because the history of the rule and the vast majority of
court decisions prior to 1998 focused on private civil practice.15 A brief
review, then, of how the rule developed and was applied to private lawyers
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009). For links to the current rules of
professional conduct in each state, see Links of Interest, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/
links_of_interest.html#States (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
13. See Mark H. Aultman, The Story of a Rule, 2000 MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 713, 713-23
(2000); Bowman, supra note 8, at 721-23.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006).
15. The CPA might logically have been expected to hold federal prosecutors to the same
standards as state prosecutors rather than “other attorneys” generally. As suggested by Zacharias
and Green, however, the CPA debate did not linger on this distinction. See Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88. GEO. L.J. 207, 224 (2000) (“An
essential assumption of the CPA is that federal prosecutors should, for purposes of legal ethics, be
treated more like private lawyers and state prosecutors.”).
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illustrates the constraints that federal prosecutors were expected to
encounter under the CPA.
In a system that works best when all parties are represented, the ABA
and the states adopted the no-contact rule to protect the lawyer-client
relationship.16 The rule is intended to prevent a lawyer from pressuring or
tricking another lawyer’s client into saying or doing something that might
undermine the client’s legal position.17 Violations may be addressed in
court with sanctions against the lawyer’s case (e.g., suppression of the
evidence) or against the lawyer personally (e.g., fines or disqualification).18
Violations may also be referred to state bar authorities for investigation and
action against the lawyer’s bar license.19
In a typical private case—let’s call it X v. Y—application of the rule is
straightforward: X’s lawyer may not communicate with Y if Y’s lawyer
does not consent.20 The prohibition applies regardless of timing—whether,
for example, the communication comes before or after a complaint is
filed.21 X’s lawyer may not speak with Y even if Y initiates the

16. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udel, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 324-25
(1992).
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (“This Rule contributes to the
proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by
a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the
matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled
disclosure of information relating to the representation.”). Iterations of the rule’s basic purpose
have remained constant over time. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (“To preserve the proper functioning of the legal profession as
well as to shield the adverse party from improper approaches the [rule] is wise and beneficent and
should be obeyed.”).
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. n
(2011); ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 10-11, 420
(7th ed. 2011).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. n.
20. X’s lawyer may communicate with Y if Y is unrepresented, see MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 9, but may not say anything that might confuse Y as to X’s lawyer’s
role and loyalties in the matter, see id. R. 4.3 (Dealing With Unrepresented Person).
21. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (“This Rule applies to communications with any person who is
represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.”). In 1995, the
ABA changed the title of the Model Rule from “Communication With Party Represented By
Counsel” to “Communication With Person Represented By Counsel” to signify that the rule
prohibited communications with any represented person, not just persons who were formal
adversaries in a court proceeding. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 409-10.
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communication.22 Nor may X’s lawyer evade the prohibition by asking a
non-lawyer to communicate with Y.23
The rule does not prohibit all communications between X’s lawyer and
Y. The prohibition does not apply unless X’s lawyer actually “knows” that
Y is represented.24 Nor does the prohibition apply to communications that
concern a subject other than “the subject of the representation.”25 And if Y
is a business or other organization, X’s lawyer is only prohibited from
communicating with a relatively small group of current “constituents”
(usually employees) who are deemed to stand in Y’s shoes for purposes of
the representation; X’s lawyer may communicate with any other current
employee of Y, including most eyewitnesses, and with all former
employees.26
The rule also permits communications that are “authorized” either by a
“court order” or by “law.”27 The first of these exceptions permits a lawyer
to seek a court order when the lawyer is “uncertain” as to whether a
communication is prohibited or when the communication may be justified
by “exceptional circumstances,” such as when an otherwise-prohibited
communication is necessary to avoid serious injury.28 The second
exception—for communications authorized by “law”—applies to private
lawyers when a provision of constitutional or statutory law or a regulation
or court rule specifically requires or permits a lawyer to communicate with
another lawyer’s client.29 Thus, for example, if a procedural rule required

22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2009). Clients may, however,
communicate directly with each other even if their lawyers were involved in crafting the substance
of the communication. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4.
23. See id. R. 8.4(a) (a lawyer may not “violate the Rules . . . . through the acts of another”);
id. R. 5.3(c) (a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of a non-lawyer “that would be a violation of
the Rules . . . . if engaged in by a lawyer” if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct).
24. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8. However, “such actual knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances.” Id.
25. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4.
26. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 7. Prior to 2002, some state rules prohibited communications with
most current and former employees who had first-hand knowledge of the matter in dispute.
Subsequent revisions in many states clarified and substantially narrowed the rule’s reach to those
employees who are directly involved in Y’s legal strategy or whose actions in connection with the
matter may be imputed to Y. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 325-26 (2000); Hazard & Irwin, supra
note 2, at 834-35; Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 468 (2002).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).
28. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 6.
29. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396
(1995); BENNETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 417-18.
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that a document be served directly on named parties, X’s lawyer would not
violate the no-contact rule by mailing the document directly to Y.30
The no-contact rule, on its face and as it developed in the context of
private practice, would therefore seem to preclude prosecutors—if they
were treated like other lawyers—from engaging in or directing
communications with represented individuals being investigated for
possible criminal prosecution, unless the communication was authorized by
a court order in the matter or unless a statute or regulation specifically
authorized the communication. As demonstrated below, however, this
scheme of prosecutorial constraint was never embraced by the courts.
B. The No-Contact Rule for Federal Prosecutors (Through 1988)
Although nothing in the text of the no-contact rule specifically exempts
prosecutors from the prohibition, federal courts traditionally declined to
apply the prohibition to prosecutors during the pre-charge stage of a
criminal investigation. A 1988 Second Circuit decision, however,
threatened to up-end this settled understanding.
1.

Origins of the Pre-Charge Investigatory Exemption

As ultimately codified by the CPA, federal prosecutors are bound by
state rules of professional conduct.31 Federal prosecutors, like all DOJ
lawyers, must hold membership in at least one state bar, and such
membership carries with it the obligation to follow that jurisdiction’s
rules.32
Federal prosecutors may also be subject to professional
responsibility rules in states where they practice even if they are not
members of that state’s bar, particularly when appearing in a federal court
that has adopted the professional responsibility rules of the state in which it
sits.33
30. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Seizure of
$143,265.78, 616 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Wilkerson v. Brown, 995 P.2d 393,
397 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
31. Indeed, prosecutors are subject not only to the same rules of professional conduct as
other lawyers, but they also have additional obligations arising from their responsibilities as
“minister[s] of justice.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 & cmt.1 (2009).
32. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REV. 381, 390-92 (2002); Samuel Dash, An Alarming Assertion of Power, 78
JUDICATURE 137, 139 (1994); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31221, MCDADE-MURTHA
AMENDMENT: LEGIS. IN THE 107TH CONG. CONCERNING ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT LITIGATORS 2 & n.2 (2001).
33. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 32, at 390-92; F. Dennis Saylor, IV & J. Douglas
Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal
Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 459, 466 (1992).
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For much of the no-contact rule’s history, however, courts had little
opportunity to consider how the rule would apply to prosecutors.34 The nocontact rule applies only to lawyer-driven communications, and until the
1970s federal agents and local police investigated crimes with little
assistance from prosecutors.35 Accordingly, the rule had no bearing on
most communications during the pre-charge investigatory stage because
they were planned and executed by non-lawyer agents.
Once a prosecutor did become involved in a criminal matter, the
suspect usually had been charged or was in custody. The no-contact rule
had little relevance at this point because the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
generally prohibited communications with the suspect.36 In United States v.
Durham, a typical case from this period, the suspect had been arrested, he
had had a preliminary hearing, and he was in jail when the government
interviewed him without his lawyer’s consent.37 A prosecutor was clearly
involved by this point, and the court noted that the interviews “would
appear to raise ethical questions” under the no-contact rule.38 However,
because evidence of the communications was suppressed on Sixth
Amendment grounds,39 the Durham court did not need to elaborate on the
apparent ethical violation or determine what consequences would flow from
such a violation.40
Prosecutors became more involved in criminal investigations in the
1970s, when DOJ began to focus more heavily on white collar and

34. Application of the no-contact rule in the criminal context is primarily a question of how
the rule applies to prosecutors; criminal defense lawyers are generally treated like private lawyers
in the civil context. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against McCormick, 819 N.W.2d 442,
444 (Minn. 2012); John D. Cline, It Is Time to Fix the Federal Criminal System, 35 CHAMPION,
Sept. 2011, at 34, 35. But cf. Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1995)
(suggesting that the same no-contact rule standards should apply to defense lawyers and
prosecutors).
35. See, e.g., Jamie S. Gorelick & Geoffrey M. Klineberg, A Sensible Solution, 78
JUDICATURE 136, 141 (1994).
36. See, e.g., Cramton & Udel, supra note 16, at 328-32.
37. United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 209-11 (7th Cir. 1973).
38. Id. at 210-11.
39. Id. at 211.
40. The Supreme Court has referenced the no-contact issue in much the same fashion. For
example, in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 274-75 (1980), the Court found that a
defendant’s post-charge jailhouse statement should be suppressed on Sixth Amendment grounds.
The Court cited the no-contact rule in support of its conclusion that the government impermissibly
interfered with the defendant’s right to counsel even though, as the Court noted, the rule “does not
bear on the constitutional question.” Id. at 275 n.14. See also, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 790-91 (2009); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 n.2 (2001); Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 301 & 301 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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organized crime.41 The suspects in these cases tended to be wealthy enough
and savvy enough to hire defense counsel early in an investigation. And
DOJ wanted prosecutors to be involved early in the process as well, to fend
off legal challenges, to make grand jury presentations, and to file the
necessary court papers for electronic surveillance and other sophisticated
investigatory techniques.42
United States v. Lemonakis43 was the first federal appellate decision to
squarely address the no-contact rule in a pre-charge situation.44 A federal
prosecutor and local police were investigating an extensive burglary
conspiracy in Washington, D.C.45 A cooperating witness, working at the
investigatory team’s direction, instigated an undercover pre-charge
conversation with Lemonakis in which Lemonakis made incriminating
statements.46 Lemonakis was represented at the time, and the government
was aware of this fact.47 Lemonakis argued that the statements were
obtained in violation of the no-contact rule and should therefore be
suppressed.48
The Lemonakis court found no violation of the no-contact rule. The
court determined that applying the rule to pre-charge communications
simply imposed too great a burden on the public’s interest in effective law
enforcement.49 The court also found that the covert nature of the
communication was significant, observing that the rule was not intended to
protect a “wrongdoer” like Lemonakis from voluntarily confiding in
41. See Cramton & Udel, supra note 16, at 361-64 & n.297, 385 n.414.
42. See Cramton & Udel, supra note 16, at 318-19; Gorelick & Klineberg, supra note 35, at
141-42; see also Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,911.
43. 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
44. See United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983) (identifying
Lemonakis as the earliest federal appellate decision to consider the rule’s effect on pre-charge
covert communications). Prior decisions touching on a prosecutor’s no-contact rule obligations
involved post-arrest and custodial scenarios and so were decided on constitutional grounds. See
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 955 n.21 (distinguishing prior cases where facts presented Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations).
45. Lemonakis, 485 F. 2d at 945-46. Local crimes in the District of Columbia are prosecuted
by DOJ. See D.C. CODE § 23-101 (2001).
46. Prosecutors, like other lawyers, may not personally engage in undercover
communications. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (lawyers may not engage in
conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”); id. R. 4.1(a) (lawyers may not
make “false statement[s] of material fact or law”). It has long been recognized, however, that
prosecutors may direct the work of undercover officers or cooperating witnesses. See, e.g.,
Zacharias & Green, supra note 15, at 231 & nn.133, 134.
47. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 945-47, 956.
48. Id. at 954-55. Lemonakis also argued that the statements should be suppressed on
constitutional grounds; the court rejected this argument because Lemonakis’s right to the presence
of counsel had not yet attached. Id. at 954.
49. Id.
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someone whom he mistakenly believed would keep his confidences.50 For
the next fifteen years, all federal appellate courts addressing the issue
similarly found that—although prosecutors were subject to the no-contact
rule as a general matter51—pre-charge covert communications did not
violate the rule.52
By emphasizing the covert nature of the communication, the
Lemonakis court suggested that overt communications might be more
problematic. An overt communication—where the suspect is aware that he
or she is speaking with a government agent—inherently presents a greater
potential for coercion than a covert communication.53 A suspect might not
appreciate the option of simply walking away from a government interview
or might feel compelled to agree to a cooperation or plea deal. Several
cases during the 1980s considered pre-charge overt communications and
reflected this unease; even so, the courts in these cases declined to find any
violation, relying on Lemonakis and other covert-contact cases for the
general proposition that the rule does not prohibit pre-charge
communications in criminal investigations.54

50. Id. at 956.
51. Some commentators argued that the no-contact rule should not apply to prosecutors at
all because prosecutors are sufficiently constrained by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments from
interfering with lawyer-client relationships in criminal cases. See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence
from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and
Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1179 (1987); Saylor & Wilson, supra note 33, at 459.
Virtually all federal courts rejected this argument, finding instead that the rule did apply to
prosecutors as a general matter. See, e.g., United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 111 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Cramton & Udell,
supra note 16, at 327. This conclusion, however, simply gave courts discretion to interpret the
rule; it did not require courts to prohibit all or even most communications engaged in or directed
by prosecutors.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that the
rule “was meant to ensure that lawyers not prey on [represented] persons,” not to protect
represented criminal suspects); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding that the rule was not intended to “stymie” undercover investigations simply because the
suspect retained counsel); United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that
applying the rule before charging “would simply enable criminal suspects, by retaining counsel, to
hamper the government’s conduct of legitimate investigations”); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d
1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that pre-charge undercover communications “do[] not
implicate the sorts of ethical problems addressed by” the rule).
53. See, e.g., Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial
Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635, 1662 (1994) (“The rule seeks to
prevent attorneys from using their superior legal knowledge and authoritative position to
manipulate the layperson. These concerns are simply inapplicable in the undercover context,
where the target of a criminal investigation believes he is speaking with another private
layperson.”).
54. See United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 933-35 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no violation for
a pre-charge interview in the prosecutor’s office but still “question[ing] the ethical propriety of
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Given the courts’ broad acceptance of both covert and overt pre-charge
communications, there was little occasion to address appropriate sanctions
for a pre-charge violation.55 In particular, courts did not need to decide
whether suppression was an appropriate remedy—a remedy that, if
available, would likely inspire a flood of no-contact rule challenges by
criminal defendants.
2.

United States v. Hammad

A seismic shock to the status quo arrived in 1988 with United States v.
Hammad,56 the first federal appellate decision to find that a pre-charge
communication violated the no-contact rule.57 Hammad was being
investigated for Medicaid fraud; he knew about the investigation and had
hired a lawyer. Another suspect in the matter agreed to cooperate and to
record a conversation with Hammad.58 The prosecutor supplied the
cooperator with a sham grand jury subpoena to help him elicit information
from Hammad.59 The conversation took place six months before Hammad
was charged.60
The Hammad court rejected the bright-line pre-charge investigatory
exemption established by Lemonakis and other earlier decisions.61 The
court reasoned that the goal of the no-contact rule—”to safeguard the
integrity of the profession and preserve public confidence in our system of
interviewing a potential criminal defendant . . . when the interview is likely to elicit
[incriminating] information”); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Although
in some [unspecified] circumstances,” overt communications might violate the rule, this precharge “noncustodial interview” did not); United States v. Standard Drywall Corp., 617 F. Supp.
1283, 1300-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no violation where agents conducting pre-charge
interviews were not working at the prosecutor’s direction, but also suggesting that pre-charge noncustodial interviews generally would not violate the rule, particularly if the suspect is free to leave
or to speak with a lawyer).
55. See, e.g., Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 956 (“We find there was no ethical breach by the
[prosecutors]; accordingly, we need not reach what legal consequences might flow had we
concluded otherwise.”).
56. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. See generally John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of
the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 423, 428-32 (1997) (describing the
significance of Hammad); Neil Salon, Note, Prosecutors and Model Rule 4.2: An Examination of
Appropriate Remedies, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 397-98 (1999) (same).
58. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 835.
59. Id. at 835-36. The subpoena was a “sham” because the prosecutor created the document
“not to secure [the cooperator’s] attendance before the grand jury, but to create a pretense that
might help [him] elicit admissions from a represented suspect.” Id. at 840. The cooperator
showed the sham subpoena to Hammad who, believing that it was genuine, “devis[ed] strategies
for [the cooperator] to avoid compliance.” Id. at 836.
60. Id. at 835-36.
61. See id. at 838-39.
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justice”—was not limited to the post-charge phase.62 Moreover, limiting
the rule’s reach to the “moment” of formal charging would, according to the
court, invite the prosecutor to “manipulate” the system by delaying charges
in order to take advantage of the pre-charge investigatory exemption.63
Having concluded that pre-charge communications could violate the
rule, the court went on to find that the communication with Hammad did
violate the rule because the prosecutor’s creation of a sham subpoena was
not a “legitimate investigative technique[].”64 The court did not explain
why a sham subpoena was particularly problematic, and it expressly
declined to identify other techniques that might violate the rule.65 Instead,
the court left the delineation between acceptable and unacceptable
techniques to “case-by-case adjudication.”66
The Hammad court acknowledged that the prosecutor could not have
anticipated that this communication would violate the rule. Given the
“uncertainty” in no-contact rule jurisprudence, the court determined that
suppressing evidence of the conversation would be inappropriate in this
case.67 For future cases, however, suppression would be an available
remedy for pre-charge violations. In the court’s view, suppression for a nocontact rule violation would serve the same salutary purposes as
suppression for a constitutional violation: deterring improper government
conduct, excluding tainted evidence, and maintaining public trust in the
system.68
Although Hammad seemed to threaten the ability of prosecutors to be
involved in pre-charge communications with represented suspects, the court
emphasized that many such communications would not violate the rule.
Specifically, the court observed that “legitimate investigative techniques,”
generally including the use of informants, would “frequently” fall within

62. Id. at 839.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 840.
65. Id. Zacharias and Green point out that a sham subpoena particularly “implicate[s] the
integrity of the judicial process.” Zacharias & Green, supra note 15, at 241 n.173. Hammad
itself, however, did not explicitly draw this connection. See Gleeson, supra note 57, at 434 n.49.
Indeed, the court commented that the case did not present the opportunity “to consider the use of
this technique in relation to unrepresented suspects,” 858 F.2d at 840, thus leaving open the
possibility that a sham subpoena might not always be problematic from a professional
responsibility perspective.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 842.
68. Id. at 840-41. The Hammad court did, however, exhort lower courts to “exercise their
discretion cautiously and with clear cognizance that suppression imposes a barrier between the
finder of fact and the discovery of truth.” Id. at 842.
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the “authorized by law” exception.69 Foreshadowing the trend of future
criminal no-contact rule jurisprudence, the Hammad court also suggested
that judicial precedent could be the “law” that would trigger the rule’s
“authorized by law” exception, at least in cases that did not involve a sham
subpoena or other objectionable technique.70
II. THE THORNBURGH MEMO AND THE RENO REGULATION
From DOJ’s perspective, Hammad and the prospect of similar future
decisions posed an intolerable risk to federal prosecutors personally and to
effective federal law enforcement generally. DOJ responded to Hammad
with the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation, which declared that
the no-contact rule permitted pre-charge communications without
exception—a move that proved unnecessary as courts quickly cabined off
Hammad as simply wrong or at least limited to the sham subpoena
scenario.71 The Memo and Regulation also asserted DOJ’s exclusive
authority over the no-contact rule for federal prosecutors—a move that
created a direct conflict between DOJ and the courts and invited
Congressional intervention that ultimately resulted in the CPA.72
A. DOJ Responds to Hammad
DOJ believed that Hammad, with its embrace of “case-by-case”
adjudication, would usher in an era of uncertainty regarding the no-contact
rule’s application to federal prosecutors.73 For DOJ, Hammad raised the
69. Id. at 839.
70. See id. (relying on federal precedent that recognized prosecutors’ investigative
responsibilities for the proposition that pre-charge communications will often fall within the
“authorized by law” exception); see also infra Part II.B.
71. The no-contact rule policies announced in the Memo and Regulation applied to civil
enforcement matters as well as to criminal prosecutions. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at
493; Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,910. The criminal context, however, was the primary
focus for DOJ and, ultimately, for Congress and the CPA. See generally Note, Federal
Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080,
2083-86 (2000) (describing the provisions of the Memo and the Regulation); Todd S. Schulman,
Note, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of Justice’s Attempt to Exempt Federal
Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1067-76 (1996) (same).
72. See generally Michael L. Stern, Ethical Obligations of Congressional Lawyers, 63
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 191, 209 n.61 (2007) (describing the conflict that led to the CPA);
Bradley T. Tennis, Note, Uniform Ethical Regulation of Federal Prosecutors, 120 YALE L.J. 144,
151 (2010) (same).
73. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 490; Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at
39,911; see also Stern, supra note 72, at 209 n.61; Katherine R. Brody & Chris Tatrowicz, A
Change of Heart for the DOJ: Policy Run Amok or Greater Respect for Ethical Norms?, 20 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 431 (2007).
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specter of inconsistency from one case to another and certainly from one
jurisdiction to another.74 With many investigations spanning multiple
district court jurisdictions, similar communications conducted in a single
investigation might alternately violate and not violate the rule. And with
different prosecutors on the same case sometimes members of different
state bars, the prospect of multiple and conflicting no-contact rules applying
in the same case was heightened even further.75
According to DOJ, prosecutors facing such uncertainty had an
impossible choice: either risk a rule violation or decline to participate in the
investigation.76 The first option would subject the prosecutor to potential
personal sanctions and might result in suppression of the evidence. Under
the second option, either the entire investigative team would refrain from
communications that potentially violated the rule, or agents would have to
conduct this aspect of the investigation without the benefit of legal
guidance.77 Neither choice boded well for DOJ, and the Attorney General
ultimately decided to “take action to protect the interests of both law
enforcement and the public.”78
DOJ’s first post–Hammad salvo came in 1989 with the Thornburgh
Memo. The Thornburgh Memo was an internal declaration of DOJ policy,
with no evidence that DOJ formally solicited any outside input.79 The
Memo concluded that interpretation of the no-contact rule was “solely a
question of [DOJ] policy” and that DOJ’s interpretation therefore
superseded any contrary federal court decisions.80 Citing the Supremacy
Clause, the Memo also concluded that DOJ’s interpretation of the rule
superseded state court decisions as well.81 Indeed, DOJ hinted that the

74. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 490; Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at
39,911.
75. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 490; Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at
39,911.
76. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 490-91; Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at
39,911.
77. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,911.
78. Jamie S. Gorelick, Contacts With Represented Persons, 11 CRIM. JUST., Summer 1996,
at 40, 40. Gorelick was Deputy Attorney General under Attorney General Janet Reno.
79. The Memo recounted the positions of various DOJ components, see Thornburgh Memo,
supra note 10, at 491-92; DOJ did not solicit outside views until the regulatory process leading up
to the Reno Regulation.
80. Id. at 491. The Memo relied on an earlier advisory opinion by DOJ’s Office of Legal
Counsel, which concluded that neither federal nor state courts had authority to impose sanctions
for conduct “within the scope of [a government attorney’s] federal responsibilities,” leaving
interpretation of the rule to DOJ’s discretion. See Ethical Restraints of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility on Federal Criminal Investigations, 4B Op. O.L.C. 576, 577 (1980).
81. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 490.
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authority claimed in the Memo might logically extend to any professional
conduct rule being interpreted in a manner that “interfere[d] with the
legitimate investigative prerogatives of the government.”82
Having staked its claim of DOJ authority, the Memo then purported to
exempt all prosecutorial pre-charge communications from the no-contact
rule:
It is the clear policy of the Department that in the course of a criminal
investigation, [a federal prosecutor] is authorized to direct and supervise
the use of undercover law enforcement agents, informants, and other
cooperating individuals to gather evidence by communicating with any
person [in the pre-charge phase]. It is further the policy and the
experience of the Department that what it may do in an undercover setting,
83
it may similarly do overtly.

DOJ, undoubtedly recognizing the furor that would follow, ended the
Memo with a promise to codify the policy through the regulatory process.84
DOJ fulfilled that promise with the 1994 Reno Regulation.85 After
multiple rounds of soliciting, reviewing, and responding to comments, DOJ
could—and did—claim the legitimacy of an extensive public rulemaking
process.86 DOJ employed language designed to position the Regulation
within accepted professional norms, promising to hold DOJ lawyers to “the
highest ethical standards”87 and to ensure respect for “the principles
underlying” the no-contact rule.88 The Regulation’s overarching “General
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 492. Though short on specifics, the Memo suggested that even post-charge
communications might be permitted if DOJ believed that defense counsel had conflicted loyalties,
such as “where a single attorney represents several individuals (one of whom is the principal
target and is paying for everyone’s representation) or an organization and all its employees (when
the organization is the target and is paying for the representation).” Id. at 489. The Reno
Regulation clarified that communications in these circumstances should be pre-approved by a
court. Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,929-30 (Section 77.6).
84. See Thornburgh Memo, supra note 10, at 493.
85. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11.
86. See id. at 39,910 (“This final rule . . . culminates a lengthy rulemaking process in which
a proposed rule on the same subject was issued three separate times for comment.”); see generally
Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of Lawyers, 2003 PROF.
LAW. 15, 28 n.75 (2003) (describing the regulatory process leading to the Reno Regulation);
Neals-Erik William Delker, Comment, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing
Conflict Over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Attorneys, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 855,
856 n.1 (1995) (same); Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or
Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1258-59 & nn.32, 34 (2001) (same).
87. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,914 (“[T]he content of [the General Rule]
derives largely from” the Model Rule).
88. Id. at 39,911. To promote “respect” for the defense lawyer-client relationship, the Reno
Regulation prohibited disparagement of defense counsel and also prohibited solicitation of
privileged information or attorney work product. Id. at 39,923.
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Rule” largely echoed the ABA Model Rule,89 prohibiting communications
with a represented person regarding the subject of the representation unless
the represented person’s lawyer consented.90 Also like the Model Rule, the
General Rule contained an exception for communications that were
“authorized by law.”91
Notwithstanding the conciliatory tone, substantively the Regulation
was essentially just a more detailed version of the Thornburgh Memo that
preceded it.92 The various specific provisions of the Regulation, read
together, permitted—as did the Thornburgh Memo—virtually all pre-charge
communications.93 And unlike the Model Rule, the General Rule
referenced the Regulation itself as “law” that would trigger the “authorized
by law” exception.94
DOJ argued that this self-authorizing “authorized by law” exception
was justified by the need for a definitive and uniform no-contact standard
for federal prosecutors in the wake of the uncertainty promulgated by
Hammad.95 DOJ also argued that the policy was justified as an appropriate
expression of the Attorney General’s authority to regulate the conduct of
DOJ lawyers under the Supremacy Clause and a multitude of federal
statutes.96 And, similarly to the Thornburgh Memo, DOJ suggested in the
Regulation that federal prosecutors might not be bound by outside
89. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,914 (“the content of [the General Rule]
derives largely from” the Model Rule).
90. See id. at 39,929 (Section 77.5).
91. See id. at 39,927, 39,929.
92. See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 651 n.367 (2004); see
also Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front Assault on
the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 561 & n.410
(2003); cf. Hazard & Irwin, supra note 2, at 808 (noting that like the Thornburgh Memo, “[t]he
Reno Regulation purported to preempt and supersede state ethical rules, but unlike the
Thornburgh memorandum, it gave specific guidance about what types of investigatory contacts
were permissible.”).
93. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,910 (“In essence, this regulation permits
federal prosecutors . . . to make or direct undercover or overt contacts with individuals and
organizations represented by counsel for the purpose of developing factual information up until
the point at which they are arrested or charged with a crime.”). The Regulation also permitted
communications with most employees of a represented organization, see id. at 39,931 (Section
77.10), a change that was largely embraced for all lawyers as part of the 2002 revision to Model
Rule 4.2. See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 414-15; see also supra note 26.
94. The exception in the General Rule was for communications “as provided in this
[Regulation] or as otherwise authorized by law.” Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,929
(emphasis added); see also id. at 39,911 (“This final rule, a duly promulgated regulation, is
intended to constitute ‘law’ within the meaning of the ‘authorized by law’ exception.”).
95. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,911.
96. See id. at 39,915-16.
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interpretation of any rule of professional conduct that was “inconsistent”
with DOJ’s “law enforcement responsibilities.”97
Finally, the Regulation established an entirely internal process for
responding to allegations of no-contact rule misconduct and punishing any
violations. “[T]o ensure consistency and uniformity,” the Regulation
replaced the traditional disciplinary authority of state and federal courts
with review by DOJ’s own Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).98
Under the Regulation, OPR would investigate allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct and make disciplinary recommendations to the Attorney
General, who had exclusive enforcement authority.99 With this disciplinary
provision, DOJ completed its self-authorizing loop of control—from
promulgating its own rule to interpreting its own rule to enforcing its own
rule.
B. Status Quo in the Courts (1989-1997)
DOJ defended the Thornburgh Memo and, especially, the Reno
Regulation as the necessary antidote to an uncertain post-Hammad world.
DOJ acknowledged that Hammad’s impact was “muted substantially” by
subsequent decisions,100 but insisted that without DOJ intervention future
federal and state court decisions might prohibit a federal prosecutor from
involvement in even well-accepted (covert, no sham subpoena) pre-charge
communications.101 In fact, however, federal and state court decisions from
the decade leading up to the CPA simply continued on the well-charted path
that began with Lemonakis.

97. See id. at 39,911.
98. Id. at 39,926.
99. Id. at 39,926 & 39,931 (Section 77.11). The Regulation did permit state bar discipline of
DOJ lawyers who willfully violated the Regulation. This power, however, could be exercised
only after the Attorney General determined that there was such a violation. See id. at 39,931
(Section 77.12).
100. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,911; see also Thornburgh Memo, supra note
10, at 490 (“Hammad no longer poses the same threat to federal law enforcement objectives that it
once did.”).
101. See Gorelick, supra note 78, at 40 (Deputy Attorney General arguing that “some overly
expansive interpretations” of the no-contact rule threw into doubt a federal prosecutor’s ability to
direct pre-charge undercover communications); see also Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 473 (1996) (“[For DOJ,] the mere prospect that evidence
might be suppressed or, even worse, that federal prosecutors might be sanctioned personally for
violating the no-contact rule remained chilling.”).
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Federal Courts: Hammad has Little Impact

Federal courts outside the Second Circuit quickly rejected Hammad’s
broad holding that the no-contact rule could prohibit pre-charge
investigatory communications.102 Typical was United States v. Ryans,
involving a criminal antitrust investigation where the prosecutor instructed
a cooperating witness to telephone the suspects and engage them in
conversation regarding their rate-setting practices.103 The Ryans court
rejected Hammad in favor of Lemonakis and other pre-Hammad decisions,
finding that applying the rule in the pre-charge phase would “unduly
restrict[]” law enforcement efforts against those criminal suspects who, like
Ryans, were able to retain counsel early in the proceedings.104
Ryans also demonstrated the limited reach of Hammad’s “sham
subpoena” holding. Similarly to the prosecutor in Hammad, the prosecutor
in Ryans issued a subpoena to the cooperating witness for the purpose of
concealing his cooperation.105 Ryans argued that, as in Hammad, the
prosecutor’s use of a subpoena in this way—to further the government’s
deception rather than to secure an appearance before the grand jury—
violated the no-contact rule.106 The court rejected the Hammad analogy out
of hand as the prosecutor in Ryans had issued a real subpoena.107 More
importantly, the court questioned the soundness of Hammad’s legal
conclusion that even fake subpoenas were necessarily improper, and the
court broadly endorsed the government’s use of “‘appropriate artifice and
deception to ferret out illegal activities.’”108
Hammad similarly had little impact on prosecutors’ ability to engage in
overt pre-charge communications. Few decisions during the decade
between Hammad and the CPA addressed overt communications, but the
tension continued between recognizing the importance to effective law
enforcement investigations of a broad pre-charge exemption and unease

102. See, e.g., United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Powe,
9 F.3d 68, 69 & n.4 (9th Cir 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir 1990);
United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 421-22 (D. Md. 1994); United States v. Infelise, 773 F.
Supp. 93, 94-95 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
103. Ryans, 903 F.2d at 733-34.
104. Id. at 739-40.
105. See id. at 733, 737-38.
106. See id. at 738.
107. Id. at 738 n.8 (“[T]he subpoena at issue in this case was not fictitious; it was simply
unnecessary.”).
108. See id. (citation omitted); see also Infelise, 773 F. Supp. at 95 (finding that issuing a
subpoena to a cooperating witness so that the suspect’s “suspicion would not be aroused” was “an
appropriate investigative tool”).
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with the inherent coerciveness of an interview by government agents.109
One court, for example, found that the prosecutor did not violate the nocontact rule for pre-charge investigatory interviews with arguably
represented employees of a corporation being investigated by DOJ,
rejecting Hammad in favor of Ryans.110 Another court, however, found a
violation where an overt interview strayed beyond factual investigation to
negotiating disposition of potential charges against the suspect.111
Ultimately, however, the Ward court, like the Hammad court, was
unwilling to suppress the evidence or “punish” the prosecutor where the law
remained “unsettled.”112
Even the Second Circuit proceeded much as it had before Hammad—
with broad deference to the concept of a pre-charge investigatory exemption
for prosecutors.113 Appellate and district court decisions from within the
Circuit now acknowledged that, per Hammad, the no-contact rule could
prohibit pre-charge investigatory communications. But none of them found
that a pre-charge communication actually did violate the rule.114 So long as
the communication did not involve a sham subpoena—described by one
court as the “critical element” from Hammad115—the prosecutor’s actions
were not found to violate the no-contact rule.116 And this proposition
carried over to the overt communications realm as well.117

109. See supra Part I.B.1 discussion of pre-Hammad overt communications decisions.
110. See In re Doe, 876 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
111. See United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
112. Id. at 1007-08. Also significant to the decision was that the suspect voluntarily chose to
speak with the government. Id. at 1007.
113. In one pre-Hammad decision, for example, the Second Circuit noted that disallowing
prosecutorial pre-charge communications “would simply enable criminal suspects, by retaining
counsel, to hamper the government’s conduct of legitimate investigations.” See United States v.
Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 64849 (2d Cir. 1995).
114. See Simels, 48 F.3d at 649 (noting that none of the nine post-Hammad appellate or
district court decisions from the Second Circuit found a violation of the rule); see also Bowman,
supra note 8, at 738 & n.362 (“[Hammad] had no notable effect on federal law, even within the
Second Circuit.”). Indeed, the Hammad court itself was concerned that the decision would be
read to broadly prohibit undercover investigations, and twice revised its published decision in a
not-entirely-successful effort to clarify that it did not intend such a result. See id. at 737-38 &
n.362.
115. See United States v. Harloff, 807 F. Supp. 270, 276 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
116. Id. at 276-78; see also United States v. DeVillio, 983 F.2d 1185, 1192-95 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding that having a cooperator tape conversations with other suspects did not violate the rule);
United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the holding from
Hammad is “limited . . . to the circumstances of that case”).
117. See United States v. Gray, 825 F. Supp. 63, 64-65 (D. Vt. 1993) (finding that an overt
pre-charge interview was “a legitimate investigative technique” as contemplated by Hammad).
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Hammad did have one lasting—though largely unacknowledged—
impact on federal no-contact rule jurisprudence: its suggestion that judicial
precedent could trigger the “authorized by law” exception.118 Both within
the Second Circuit and elsewhere, courts citing other federal decisions
began to invoke the exception as the basis for finding that pre-charge
investigatory communications did not violate the no-contact rule.119 This
shift occurred with little explanation. Prior to Hammad, federal courts
simply declared that the rule should not be interpreted to constrain precharge communications.120 After Hammad, the “authorized by law”
exception grounded the pre-charge exemption more clearly in the structure
of the no-contact rule itself.121
In 1995, the American Bar Association recognized this new use of the
exception. So long as the “body of precedent” approving prosecutorial precharge investigatory communications “remain[ed] good law,” the ABA
would recognize such communications as falling within the “‘authorized by
law’” exception.122 Thus, virtually all pre-charge communications, or at
least those not involving a sham subpoena, could be “authorized” by the
long line of federal court decisions allowing such communications by
federal prosecutors.
2.

State Courts: No Impediment

DOJ claimed that post-Hammad uncertainty emanated not only from
federal courts, but from state courts as well. Federal courts adopted state
rules of professional conduct, and state courts and bar authorities could
discipline federal prosecutors. Therefore, according to DOJ, the disparity
among the various states’ no-contact rule restrictions required a unified
federal response.123 Again, DOJ’s concerns were not substantiated by the
actual state of the law.
DOJ provided few concrete examples of state-by-state disparities, and
the examples that it did provide had little practical bearing on criminal
investigations. Commentary accompanying the Reno Regulation suggested,

118. See, e.g., Simels, 48 F.3d at 649 (collecting Second Circuit post-Hammad cases and
noting the reliance of many on the “authorized by law” exception); see also Balter, 91 F.3d at 436;
United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 421 (D. Md. 1994).
119. See, e.g., Simels, 48 F.3d at 649 (collecting Second Circuit post-Hammad cases and
noting the reliance of many on the “authorized by law” exception); see also Balter, 91 F.3d at 436;
United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 421 (D. Md. 1994).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
121. See, e.g., Balter, 91 F.3d at 436.
122. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
123. See Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,911-14.
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for example, that some states found that the rule never applied during the
pre-charge phase while others, following Hammad’s reasoning, found that it
did.124 What DOJ did not acknowledge, however, was that almost no state
authorities found that a pre-charge communication actually did violate the
rule, whatever the precise basis of the underlying reasoning.125
Moreover, federal courts simply did not consider themselves bound by
state no-contact rule opinions that contravened federal priorities as
interpreted by federal courts.126 A 1990 Florida state bar ethics opinion, for
example, had concluded that the Florida no-contact rule prohibited
prosecutors’ pre-charge investigatory communications with represented
suspects or witnesses.127 A Florida federal district court, however, rejected
this interpretation.128 Even though Florida’s rule, unlike the rule in every
other jurisdiction, contained no “authorized by law” exception, the court
relied on Lemonakis, Ryans, and other federal decisions in concluding that
the structure of the rule “contemplate[d] . . . an adversarial relationship
between litigants, not a mere investigation.”129
The basis for DOJ’s concern regarding the risk of state-imposed
discipline was—like its concern regarding varying state versions of the
rule—more theoretical than real. Although state courts certainly claimed
authority to discipline federal prosecutors who violated their professional

124. See id.
125. See, e.g., State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 1197, 1214 (N.H. 1993) (“While we do not suggest
that a prosecutor . . . may never be in violation of the rule prior to indictment, on the facts
presented here, where the defendant was not in custody and had not been criminally charged, we
find no ethical violation.”); State v. Mosher, 755 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)
(quoting Vasquez, 675 F.2d at 17) (finding that applying the rule in the pre-charge phase “‘would
simply enable criminal suspects, by retaining counsel, to hamper the government’s conduct of
legitimate investigations’”); State v. Lang, 702 A.2d 135, 137 (Vt. 1997) (finding that a precharge conversation between a cooperator and a suspect was “authorized by law”); 75 Op. Cal.
Att’y Gen. 223 (1992) (finding that pre-charge communications “are ‘authorized by law’ and may
include ex parte custodial interrogations”); Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 96 (1994) (agreeing with
the “overwhelming preponderance” of federal and state decisions holding that the rule did not
apply in the pre-charge phase).
126. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[R]equiring a
federal court to follow the various and often conflicting state court and bar association
interpretations of a disciplinary rule, interpretations that may also contravene important federal
policy concerns, threatens to balkanize federal law.”); United States v. Biersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980
F. Supp. 257, 259 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (“[A]ttorneys practicing in this Court are bound by the ethical
standards of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility . . . [only] insofar as those standards are
consistent with federal law.”).
127. Fla. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 90-4, 1990 WL 446959 (July 15, 1990).
128. In re Doe, 876 F. Supp. 265, 269 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that local bar or state
court ethics opinions are “highly persuasive” but only to the extent that such opinions are
consistent with federal priorities).
129. Id. at 268-69.
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responsibility rules, the only case prior to the CPA where a federal
prosecutor was disciplined by state authorities for violating the no-contact
rule involved post-charge communications.130 And even that decision
suggested that discipline would have been inappropriate if the
communications had occurred during the pre-charge phase.131
3.

All Courts Reject the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation

DOJ might have expected that courts would react positively to the
Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation. The Memo and the
Regulation, after all, largely stood for a proposition of law that the courts
had embraced: that federal prosecutors should not be constrained by the nocontact rule during the pre-charge investigatory phase. DOJ emphasized
this practical aspect in defending the Memo and the Regulation. Attorney
General Thornburgh, for example, explained that the Memo should be
understood as an effort to prevent the no-contact rule from impeding
criminal investigations and not as “an all-out effort all of a sudden to . . .
exempt all of our lawyers from state ethics rules.”132
Most federal court decisions, however, made little or no reference to
the Memo or the Regulation.133 Certainly the courts did not rely on them as
authority for the pre-charge investigatory exemption. Rather, the courts
simply continued to rely on federal precedent such as Lemonakis and Ryans
for this purpose.134
The few federal court decisions that did specifically address the Memo
or the Regulation focused on, and rejected, DOJ’s assertion of exclusive

130. See In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 168-70 (N.M. 1997) (finding that no provision of federal
law prohibited state authorities from disciplining a federal prosecutor).
131. See id. at 166-67 (rejecting the defendant’s reliance on Ryans, not because Ryans was
wrongly-decided but because “[i]n the present case, at the time of [the prosecutor]’s
communications with defendant, defendant had been arrested, a preliminary hearing had been
held, probable cause had been found, and defendant was in custody being held without bond”).
132. See T.R. Goldman, For McDade: Life Fuels Legislation, LEGAL TIMES (D.C.), May 18,
1998, at 1 (quoting Thornburgh); see also Gorelick & Klineberg, supra note 35, at 144 (exhorting
DOJ’s critics to focus on “what [the Regulation] actually does”—preserve the pre-charge
investigatory exemption—rather than on their concerns regarding the Attorney General’s authority
to issue the Regulation).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 435 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996) (referencing the
Memo and Regulation in passing, as part of a description of the debate over how the rule would
apply); United States v. Johnson, 68 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1995) (not referencing the Memo or
Regulation at all).
134. See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., No. 82-0192(HHG), 1990 WL 116811, at *1 n.6
(D.D.C. Aug. 03, 1990) (“The Court does not need to, and does not, rely on the [DOJ policy]
which purports to exempt Department of Justice litigators from” the no-contact rule.).
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authority.135 From a policy perspective, courts excoriated DOJ for
purporting to define the rule for its own lawyers. Not only would this
“render[] the rule meaningless,” as one district court put it, “but the notion
of such an idea coming from the country’s highest law enforcement official
displays an arrogant disregard for and irresponsibly undermines ethics in
the legal profession.”136
Federal courts also found that the Attorney General lacked sufficiently
specific authority under the Supremacy Clause or federal statutes to
preempt the courts’ traditional regulation of DOJ attorneys.
The
Thornburgh Memo—characterized by one court as “no more than a
unilateral statement of Justice Department policy”—was particularly
vulnerable in this regard.137 But even the Reno Regulation—the product of
a lengthy rule-making process—was declared “invalid” because, as the
Eighth Circuit explained, no federal law “contemplate[d] the issuance of
anything resembling” the Regulation.138
State courts had few opportunities to directly assess the Regulation.139
The association of state supreme court chief justices, however, forcefully
rejected the Regulation as a direct attack on the states’ rightful regulatory
role.140 The justices warned of a potential “constitutional confrontation”
and urged state courts “to continue to enforce the ethics rules upon all
members of [the state] bars.”141

135. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2003)
(discussing courts’ rejection of the Memo and the Regulation).
136. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486 (D.N.M. 1992); see also United States ex rel. O’Keefe
v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (finding DOJ’s “efforts
to exempt its attorneys from complying with state ethical rules disappointing”), aff’d, 132 F.3d
1252 (8th Cir. 1998).
137. See United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993); see also United
States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with the lower court’s
characterization of the Memo as “an egregious and flagrant ‘frontal assault on the legitimate
powers of the court’”).
138. O’Keefe, 132 F.3d at 1257.
139. Since federal prosecutors do not generally practice in state court, the Memo and
Regulation would primarily come before state authorities in the disciplinary context. And given
the general agreement between state and federal courts regarding the rule’s application to
prosecutors, such cases were rare. See supra Part II.B.2.
140. See Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution XII: Proposed Rule Relating to
Communications with Represented Persons (August 4, 1994), in CONFERENCE OF CHIEF
JUSTICES: RESOLUTIONS 1994-PRESENT 869, 871 (1996), http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/
collection/ctadmin/id/858.
141. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 168 (N.M. 1997) (finding that
DOJ had no authority to “issue policies or regulations that absolve its attorneys from the
responsibility to comply with ethical regulations promulgated by the courts granting them their
licenses and responsible for their conduct as officers of the court.”).
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III. THE CITIZENS PROTECTION ACT
Congress stepped into the fray in the mid-1990s. After a protracted
legislative fight, the Citizens Protection Act was approved on October 21,
1998,142 and went into effect on April 21, 1999.143 The CPA survived
several repeal efforts,144 and the pertinent text remains the same today as it
was on the day it was approved: “An attorney for the Government shall be
subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s
duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that
State.”145
Although the language is broad, the CPA’s focus is clarified through
further legislative and regulatory definition: DOJ lawyers, including federal
prosecutors, are subject to state rules of professional conduct just like all
other lawyers.146
The clear result of the CPA was that DOJ could no longer claim
authority to exempt federal prosecutors from the no-contact rule or any
other rule of professional conduct. Less clear was the CPA’s practical
impact. Both proponents and opponents of the legislation assumed that the
CPA would leave federal prosecutors substantially more constrained by the
no-contact rule than they were before. In fact, however, the CPA did no

142. After earlier bills failed to make it out of committee, proponents inserted the bill that
would become the current CPA into a time-sensitive appropriations bill. See Citizens Protection
Act, H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. (1998). This maneuver effectively immunized the measure from
substantive debate and ensured passage as failure would have left a number of federal agencies
(including DOJ) without funding. See T.R. Goldman, McDade Gets in Final Dig Against DOJ,
LEGAL TIMES (D.C.), Oct. 26, 1998, at 18 (noting that the CPA might not have passed as standalone bill). The process was described by some as an underhanded maneuver: “One might expect
that criminal justice legislation that is opposed by the president, the attorney general and the
chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee would not be blithely slipped
into the statute books. But prudence was long ago a casualty of this budget process.” Editorial,
Hampering Law Enforcement, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at C6.
143. See generally Lerner, supra note 92, at 651-54 (describing the legislative process leading
to passage of the CPA); Zacharias & Green, supra note 15, at 215 (same).
144. See Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform since Ethics 2000,
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 app. at 469 (2009); Gregory B. LeDonne, Recent Development,
Revisiting the McDade Amendment: Finding the Appropriate Solution for the Federal
Government Lawyer, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231, 237 (2007); Lerner, supra note 92, at 655-56.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012).
146. The phrase “attorney for the Government” is defined to mean lawyers employed by DOJ
or independent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(c); 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (2013). The phrase “laws
and rules” is defined to mean laws and rules “that prescribe ethical conduct for attorneys and that
would subject an attorney, whether or not a [DOJ] attorney, to professional discipline.” See 28
C.F.R. § 77.2(h).
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more to affect prosecutorial conduct under the no-contact rule than did the
Hammad decision, the Thornburgh Memo, or the Reno Regulation before it.
A. Shared Expectation: The End of the Pre-Charge Investigatory
Exemption
The CPA largely owes its existence to the determination of
Representative Joseph McDade (R-Pennsylvania).147 McDade’s crusade for
the CPA—and truly it was a crusade—was motivated by personal
experience. After a lengthy DOJ investigation, McDade was tried on public
corruption charges in 1995. McDade was acquitted at trial, but he emerged
from the experience convinced that federal prosecutors routinely
disregarded applicable ethics rules.148
McDade intended the CPA to nullify the Reno Regulation, which he
perceived as allowing DOJ to shield prosecutorial misconduct from public
scrutiny and discipline. Although not specifically mentioned in the CPA,
the no-contact rule—as the centerpiece of the Reno Regulation—became
the focal point of the CPA debate.149 Both CPA supporters and opponents
expected that the new law would subject federal prosecutors to state
interpretations of the no-contact rule—just like “other attorneys in that
147. See generally John G. Douglass, Jimmy Hoffa’s Revenge: White-Collar Rights Under the
McDade Amendment, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 123, 133-34 (2002) (describing McDade’s
lead role in passing the CPA); Lerner, supra note 92, at 650-56 (same); Zacharias & Green, supra
note 15, at 211-16 (same).
148. See Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R. 3386
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 7 (1996) (statement of Rep. McDade) (“My experience, my colleagues, is by no means an
isolated case.”); id. at 10 (“There have been more than enough examples of prosecutorial
misconduct to warrant more ethics regulations, rather than less.”); Goldman, supra note 142, at
25. Representative Jack Murtha (D-Pennsylvania) was McDade’s primary legislative ally. Like
McDade, Murtha had been the subject of a public corruption investigation. Although never
prosecuted, Murtha was named as an unindicted coconspirator in the Abscam scandal of the early
1980s. Lerner, supra note 92, at 643. Lerner has explored the heightened willingness of members
of Congress to support defendant-friendly legislation when they have personally experienced the
sting of a federal investigation. See id. at 599 (“Over the centuries, legislators have been menaced
by criminal prosecution, and this prospect has, on significant occasions, shaped the development
of Anglo-American criminal procedure.”); see also Charles Finnie, DOJ Notebook (McDade’s
Revenge), LEGAL TIMES (D.C.), May 27, 1996, at 18 (quoting a joking comment by a past
president of the National Association of Defense Counsel: “‘If we indict a few more congressmen,
we might find more support for our view.’”).
149. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 147, at 134 (“[The CPA] was aimed broadly at the
supremacy arguments of the Reno Regulation, though the committee hearings focused almost
exclusively on the rules governing contact with represented parties.”); Robert Morvillo,
Implications of Prosecutors Observing State Ethical Standards, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 2001, at 3
(“Although by its terms [the CPA] extends to all state ethical rules, historically the primary source
of controversy regarding prosecutors behavior has centered around the no-contact rules.”).
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State”—and that state law would narrow or eliminate the availability of the
pre-charge investigatory exemption.150 The two sides simply disagreed as
to whether this was a good outcome or a bad outcome.
McDade and his allies framed their argument around a theme of basic
fairness—that the CPA was the necessary antidote to prosecutorial power
run amok.151 As explained by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, the CPA—in requiring compliance with the no-contact
rule—prevented prosecutors from “being tricky with citizens not trained in
the law,” which was especially important “in cases involving federal
prosecutors, who have extraordinary powers to destroy people’s lives.”152
The pro-CPA forces had something of a public relations problem in that the
individuals who would most immediately benefit from the CPA were
suspected criminals—not, generally, the most sympathetic group.153 They
found an appealing example, however, in Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr’s 1998 interrogation of White House intern Monica Lewinsky
regarding her personal relationship with President Bill Clinton. Although
Lewinsky herself was not a popular figure, her only “crime” was, perhaps, a
substantial lack of good judgment. Starr’s team tricked Lewinsky into
showing up at a hotel where she thought she would be meeting a friend.154
Instead, Lewinsky was ambushed by government agents who interviewed
her for hours, tried to convince her to sign a cooperation agreement, and
dissuaded her from contacting her lawyer.155 Although a judge reviewing
the matter expressed “concern” about the interview,156 Starr was never

150. See, e.g., Finnie, supra note 148, at 18; Goldman, supra note 132, at 25; Goldman, supra
note 142, at 18; Harvey Berkman, It Is No Longer OK For Federal Prosecutors To Flout State
Ethics Rules, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.), Nov. 2, 1998, at A8.
151. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. 2592, 2594 (1998) (introduction of the CPA by Rep. McDade)
(“[The CPA] will safeguard the citizens of [the] [n]ation from unfair, abusive and unethical
conduct by employees of the Department of Justice.”); Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors
Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R. 3386 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 10 (1996) (“A requirement in all 50 states . . . [is] that it is
unethical to communicate directly with suspects in the absence of their lawyer. The Department
of Justice, through the [Reno Regulation], is attempting to circumvent this essential . . . right.”).
152. Goldman, supra note 132, at 25 (quoting an NACDL lobbyist).
153. The alleged prosecutorial misconduct in McDade’s case involved a conflict of interest,
not a no-contact rule violation. See Davis, supra note 2, at 459 n.363; Zacharias & Green, supra
note 15, at 212. This may have been one of the reasons that McDade focused so heavily on the
no-contact rule—from the beginning of the debate, there could be no suggestion that McDade
himself would have personally benefitted from the CPA. See Finnie, supra note 148, at 2.
154. See Davis, supra note 2, at 419.
155. See id. at 419-20.
156. See Andy Puccinelli, President’s Message, State Ethics Rules Should Apply to Federal
Prosecutors, Nev. Law., April 1999, at 5.
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disciplined.157 CPA proponents trumpeted Lewinsky’s experience as
typical of what ordinary Americans could expect if the CPA failed and
federal prosecutors continued to disregard the no-contact rule.158
Opponents of the CPA focused on specific examples of how the CPA
would impede—or, arguing for repeal, had impeded—the investigation of
serious federal crimes.159 They pointed to allegedly thwarted investigations
of wide-ranging drug and government fraud conspiracies,160 and they
claimed that the CPA’s dismantling of the pre-charge investigatory
exemption would slow down efforts to quickly apprehend the individuals or
organizations behind the September 11 terrorist attacks.161 They painted a
stark picture of criminals running rampant while federal prosecutors stood
by helplessly, hamstrung by the CPA from pre-charge investigatory
communications.
A DOJ ethics advisor arguing for the CPA’s repeal provided what she
described as “real-life” examples of the CPA’s “deleterious effect on
criminal prosecutions.”162 Radack’s lead example was a 1998 California
157. The court reviewing allegations of Starr’s misconduct referred the matter to DOJ’s
Office of Professional Responsibility. See Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of Commitment: Legal
Ethics in the Impeachment Context, 52 STAN. L. REV. 269, 334 (2000). There is no public record
of DOJ discipline for Starr, nor any suggestion in the literature that he was in fact disciplined.
See, e.g., Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the U.S. Department of Justice, (Nov.
16, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1998/November/546crm.htm (announcing that DOJ had
dismissed “many” of the ethics allegations against Starr’s office); Editorial, Mr. Starr’s
Departure, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1999, at A28 (“The various ethical allegations against [Starr]
have mostly melted away on close inspection.”).
158. See, e.g., Sapna K. Khatiwala, Note, Toward Uniform Application of the “No-Contact”
Rule: McDade Is the Solution, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 111, 111-12 & n.11 (1999) (arguing that
“even more troubling” than Starr’s interrogation of Lewinsky “is the idea that [Starr’s] actions are
emulated by experienced prosecutors who exercise similar tactics as standard procedure”);
Goldman, supra note 132, at 25 (“The [no-contact rule issue] has taken on resonance since the
Monica Lewinsky story broke.”). Starr’s conduct inspired Congress to extend the CPA’s
application to Independent Counsels. See Khatiwala, supra, at 113 n.19.
159. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) led the legislative
opposition to the CPA. Hatch and Leahy, both members of the Judiciary Committee, were closely
aligned with DOJ’s effort to maintain maximum investigative flexibility for federal prosecutors.
See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, supra note
71, at 2093-94; Tennis, supra note 72, at 155-56.
160. 145 CONG. REC. 630, 1027 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“It is in [cases such as
these] that [the CPA] will have its most pernicious effect. Federal attorneys investigating and
prosecuting these cases, which frequently encompass three, four, or five states, will be subject to
the differing [no-contact] rules of each.”).
161. 147 CONG. REC. 19,431, 19,496 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“At a time when we
need federal law enforcement authorities to move quickly to catch those responsible for the
September 11th attacks, and to prevent further attacks on our country, we can no longer tolerate
the drag on federal investigations and prosecutions caused by [the CPA].”).
162. Jesselyn Alicia Radack, The Big Chill: Negative Effects of the McDade Amendment and
the Conflict Between Federal Statutes, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 707 (2001).
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environmental disaster that resulted from an oil spill at sea.163 Federal
agents boarded the tanker ship to interview the crew. The agents, however,
were rebuffed by lawyers for the ship’s owners who claimed to represent all
employees on the ship and argued that the California no-contact rule
therefore prohibited the interviews.164 Apparently out of concern regarding
the CPA, the prosecutors directed the agents to abandon the interviews, thus
substantially slowing down and narrowing the scope of the investigation.165
Notwithstanding its opponents’ list of seemingly compelling examples,
the CPA—and the rhetoric of basic fairness—won the legislative debate.
As demonstrated below, however, the CPA did not in fact make any
difference in whether or not federal prosecutors could be involved in precharge communications. Passage of the CPA made it no more likely that
Ken Starr would be found to have violated the no-contact rule, nor did it
mean that prosecutors investigating the California oil spill had to order
agents to cease their interviews.166 Whatever federal prosecutors could (or
could not) do before the CPA, they could (or could not) do after.
B. Status Quo in the Courts (1998-Present)
Uncertainty regarding the CPA’s effect on federal prosecutors was
understandable in the immediate wake of the new law. The CPA, after all,
was intended to give individual state authorities control over federal
prosecutors’ compliance with the no-contact rule within their geographic
borders.167 United States v. Plumley168 underscored this uncertainty.

163. Id. at 710.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. A more compelling example described by Radack concerned a different rule of
professional conduct—the Oregon rule prohibiting deception by lawyers. See id. at 715-18.
Although every state has a similar rule, the Oregon Supreme Court—alone among the states—
determined that the rule prohibited government lawyers as well as private lawyers from directing
undercover operations. See id. at 716-17 (describing In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000)). Federal
prosecutors withdrew from all such operations in the state. Id. at 717. While Gatti clearly
conflicted with federal law, the deception rule—unlike the no-contact rule—had no “authorized by
law” exception, and so DOJ concerns regarding potential state discipline against federal
prosecutors were more than theoretical. The crisis was resolved in 2002 after a DOJ complaint
filed in federal court prompted Oregon to change its rule to permit supervision of otherwise lawful
covert activities. See Barry R. Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based
vs. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123, 139-41 (2008).
167. See, e.g., N.Y. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 133 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that
the CPA “was enacted in direct response to the DOJ’s attempt to exempt its lawyers from state
ethical rules . . . [and] reflects the respect Congress has for the right of the states to regulate the
ethical conduct of lawyers who practice law in their jurisdictions.”).
168. 207 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Plumley sought to suppress evidence of a pre-charge interview orchestrated
by DOJ, relying on the CPA and a state ethics decision that Plumley
claimed prohibited the contact.169 The court rejected Plumley’s argument
because the interview occurred prior to passage of the CPA and found that
the interview fell squarely within pre-CPA precedent establishing the precharge exemption.170 Ominously for DOJ, however, the court noted that the
CPA “may inform our approach to future cases.”171
As it turned out, most post-CPA decisions have not mentioned the CPA
at all,172 or they simply note the uncontroversial fact that, per the CPA, state
rules of professional conduct “apply” to federal prosecutors.173 Due largely
(if sometimes implicitly) to the “authorized by law” exception—which was
almost completely absent from the CPA debate—the pre-charge exemption
carved out by federal courts has endured.
1.

Federal Courts: The CPA has Little Impact

United States v. Brown is typical of post-CPA decisions reaffirming the
broad exemption for covert pre-charge communications.174 Unlike most of
these decisions, however, Brown explicitly addressed the CPA’s impact,
and the decision illustrates why the widely-shared assumptions about the
CPA’s anticipated effects proved to be so mistaken.
Brown was charged in connection with a fraudulent accounting scheme
carried out in Pennsylvania.175 He moved to suppress surreptitiously
recorded pre-charge conversations between himself and a cooperating
witness.176 Brown argued that the Pennsylvania no-contact rule prohibited
the communication and that the CPA effectively nullified earlier Third
Circuit precedent—United States v. Balter—that had embraced the precharge exemption.177

169. Id. at 1094-95.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1095.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 773-74 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d
303, 329-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Binder Schweitzer Emblem Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d
862, 864-67 (E.D.N.C. 2001).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Chan,
271 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
174. See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., United
States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360, 366 (9th Cir. 2011); Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1289; Cope, 312 F.3d at
773-74.
175. Brown, 595 F.3d at 503.
176. Id. at 514.
177. Id. at 514-16 (citing Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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Brown’s argument might seem appealing in the post-CPA world. After
all, if lawyers in Pennsylvania would generally be barred from investigatory
communications under the no-contact rule, wouldn’t the CPA demand the
same ground rules for federal prosecutors? The Third Circuit answered this
question with an emphatic “no” for reasons that boiled down to the simple
conclusion that the CPA did not narrow the universe of communications
permitted under the rule.178 Rather, applying the rule to federal prosecutors
meant applying the whole rule, including the “authorized by law”
exception.179
And federal precedent holding that pre-charge
communications did not violate the rule, whether decided before or after the
CPA, supplied sufficient “law” to trigger the exception.180
For the Brown court, this meant that the Balter decision authorized the
government’s communications with Brown. The fact that Balter involved
the New Jersey rule rather than the Pennsylvania rule was irrelevant.181
Moreover, for the Brown court, Balter’s underlying rationale remained as
valid after the CPA as it was before—that is, applying the rule in the
investigatory pre-charge phase would unfairly protect suspects who were
wealthy enough to hire counsel early in the process and would
“‘significantly hamper legitimate law enforcement operations.’”182
Brown also illustrated the federal courts’ continuing refusal to expand
Hammad’s list of “illegitimate” tactics beyond the sham subpoena at issue
in that case. The Brown prosecutor supplied the cooperator with a
“fictitious letter” relating to a meeting between the cooperator and the
government.183 There was no actual meeting planned, but the letter
contained an agenda for the fictitious meeting to help guide the cooperator’s
conversation with Brown.184 Although the letter gave the court “pause,” it
rejected Brown’s comparison to the Hammad sham subpoena: the letter
“did not invoke the [court’s authority] or contain any forged signatures, the
letter was not addressed to Brown, and the letter in no way purported to
compel any action or inaction on Brown’s behalf.”185 The Ninth Circuit
recently went even further, finding that the creation of false subpoena
attachments to be used as “props” by a cooperator was no more problematic

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 516.
Id.
See id. at 515-16.
Id.
Id. at 515 (quoting Balter, 91 F.3d at 436).
Brown, 595 F.3d at 503.
Id. at 516.
Id.
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than any other undercover tactic, expressly rejecting Hammad on this
basis.186
Like covert communications, overt communications—interviews
conducted by the prosecutor or by a non-undercover agent—remain
generally acceptable under the rule. United States v. Binder Schweitzer
Emblem Co. is typical of post-CPA decisions where the court found no
reason to distinguish between covert and overt communications.187 Binder
involved a pre-charge interview with an employee of a represented
company that was suspected of making false representations to the
government.188 Noting that most federal precedent involved covert
communications, the court found this to be a distinction without a
difference as such decisions generally approved of pre-charge
communications “in categorical terms.”189 Concluding that the Fourth
Circuit would adhere to the “majority view,” Binder held that the interview
did not violate the rule.190
As was true prior to the CPA, some federal courts expressed caution
regarding overt communications’ potential for coercion—but still stopped
short of finding a violation.191 In Talao, for example, the court found that
direct pre-charge communications between the prosecutor and a represented
person could violate the rule, even though in this case they did not.192 In

186. See Carona, 660 F.3d at 365-66. Even the Second Circuit has continued to limit
Hammad to its particular facts. See United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d. 485, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“The only case in this Circuit that found ‘egregious misconduct’ under these governing
principles is Hammad itself.”).
187. See 167 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (E.D.N.C. 2001); see also United States v. Hailey, No.
WDQ-11-0540, 2012 WL 2339275, at *6 n.10 (D. Md. June 13, 2012); In re Amgen, No. 10-MC0249 (SLT)(JO), 2011 WL 2442047, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 2011); United States v. Guild, No.
1:07cr404 (JCC), 2008 WL 302316, at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2008); United States v. Tableman,
No. Crim. 99-22-B, 1999 WL 1995192, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 3, 1999).
188. Binder, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
189. Id. at 866.
190. Id.
191. See United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 222 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Bowen, No. 10-204, 2011 WL 1980281, at *1 (E.D. La. May 20, 2011) (suggesting that
an interview would violate the rule where the represented person is “coerced or in any way
intimidated into talking,” although that was not the case here); In re Criminal Investigation of
John Doe, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 375, 377-78 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting the greater “potential for abuse”
with overt contacts, but still permitting DOJ to proceed with interviews, subject to certain
conditions). One court found a violation for a pre-charge interview, but this poorly-reasoned
opinion condemned communications with represented persons in such broad terms that even
covert communications seemed problematic. See United States v. Tapp, No. 107-108, 2008 WL
2371422, at *16 (S.D. Ga. June 4, 2008) (“For the Government to go behind a lawyer’s back is a
practice that leads to mischief.”).
192. See Talao, 222 F.3d at 1140-41. Talao adopted Hammad’s case-by-case approach,
concluding that where—as here—the Department of Labor had already filed an administrative
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Talao, a represented witness contacted the prosecutor because the witness’s
employers—who were represented by the same lawyer as the witness—had
pressured her to lie to the grand jury and she did not feel that she could be
truthful with the lawyer present.193 The court found no violation under
these circumstances because “[i]t would be an anomaly to allow the
subornation of perjury to be cloaked by an ethical rule.”194
Whether overt or covert, post-charge communications are not
“authorized by law” and remain off-limits. Federal courts have, however,
carved out an additional zone of acceptance for communications with a
person who is represented on a charged crime and is being investigated for
a factually related but legally distinct uncharged crime (such as witness
tampering prior to trial on the original matter). Courts find that the rule
does not apply in these circumstances because the communication is not
“about the subject matter of the representation.”195 Since the rule does not
apply, there is no need to explicitly invoke the “authorized by law”
exception, but courts in these cases still rely on federal precedent and
invoke the same underlying rationale as the “authorized by law” cases: that
the rule “should not be construed to conflict with the public’s vital interest
in ensuring that law enforcement officers investigate uncharged criminal
activity.”196
2.

State Courts: No Impediment

The few post-CPA state court decisions on point generally continue to
embrace a broad pre-charge exemption for prosecutors.197 Most states,
moreover, have adopted a comment to their version of the no-contact rule
that indicates general acceptance of the concept that judicial precedent can
trigger the “authorized by law” exception for both covert and overt pre-

action and a qui tam complaint was pending, the parties’ “fully defined adversarial roles” were
sufficient to trigger the no-contact rule even before Talao was criminally charged. Id. at 1139. A
subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, however, indicated that the court would continue to adhere to
the broad pre-charge exemption at least in covert communications cases, where the prosecutor did
not directly “interrogate” the represented person. See Carona, 660 F.3d at 365-66.
193. Talao, 222 F.3d at 1139-40.
194. Id. at 1140.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2010); Crawford
v. United States, 60 Fed. App’x 520, 535-36 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ford, 176 F.3d 376,
381-82 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Petters, No.08-364(1) RHK/AJB, 2009 WL 1519888, at
*8-*9 (D. Minn. April 28, 2009).
196. Ford, 176 F.3d at 382.
197. See, e.g., State v. Reavley, 79 P.3d 270, 279-80 (Mont. 2003); State v. Bisaccia, 724
A.2d 836, 847 (N.J. App. Div. 1999); People v. Kabir 822 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867-70 (N.Y. Super. Ct.
2006).
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charge communications.198 And even where there are no state cases on
point or state cases are to the contrary, federal courts still approve federal
prosecutors’ pre-charge communications on the basis of federal precedent.
The no-state-law situation was confronted in United States v. Brown.199
The court in Brown relied on a prior Third Circuit decision that construed
the New Jersey version of the rule, even though the communication in
Brown occurred in Pennsylvania.200 Brown argued that under the CPA, the
“authorized by law” exception could not be triggered in the absence of a
Pennsylvania law or decision expressly authorizing the communication.201
The court disagreed, noting that both rules derived from the ABA Model
Rule and holding that the absence of state authority could not invalidate an
exception that was “well-established” through federal jurisprudence.202
A harder question arises when state law rejects (or arguably rejects) the
broad pre-charge investigatory exemption, but federal courts still decline to
find a violation or to suppress the evidence in this situation. Florida, for
example, is the one state where the no-contact rule has no “authorized by
law” exception, and a couple of older state opinions significantly
circumscribed prosecutors’ ability to participate in pre-charge
communications.203 Prior to the CPA, a Florida federal district court
decision—In re Doe—concluded that federal courts were not bound by
state law and adopted a pre-charge exemption on the basis of federal law.204
Federal courts in Florida apparently have not again had occasion to address

198. These state comments are modeled on an ABA comment to Model Rule 4.2
acknowledging that judicial precedent is sufficient to trigger the exception for both overt
(“direct”) and covert (“through investigative agents”) communications. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2009) (“Communications authorized by law may . . . include
investigative activities of [government lawyers], directly or through investigative agents, prior to
the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings.”). For links to the current rules
of professional conduct in each state, see supra note 12.
199. See 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010); discussed supra at Part III.B.1.
200. Id. at 515-16.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 515-16 & nn.20-21.
203. See Florida v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 403 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that a state
prosecutor’s pre-charge deposition of a witness who was charged and represented in a separate but
related matter violated the rule); Fla. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof. Ethics Op. 90-4 (1990) (rejecting
a prosecutorial pre-charge exemption for communications with represented suspects or witnesses).
The combination of no “authorized by law” exception and these state law decisions led one
commentator to cite Florida as a key example of how the CPA would preclude federal
prosecutors’ involvement in pre-charge communications. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State
Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, supra note 71, at 2090-91.
204. See In re Doe, 876 F. Supp. 265, 269 (M.D. Fla. 1993); discussed supra at Part II.B.2.

2.SIROTA.ARTICLE.MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

84

S OU TH WES TER N LA W REVIE W

2/28/2014 4:28 PM

[Vol. 43

the investigatory pre-charge exemption.205 However, post-CPA Florida
decisions in other professional responsibility contexts expressly rely on Doe
for this proposition, leaving the same argument readily available to federal
prosecutors in the no-contact rule context.206
Minnesota is another state with law that is potentially problematic for
federal prosecutors. In State v. Miller, the Minnesota Supreme Court
expressly adopted Hammad and found that a state prosecutor violated the
rule by refusing repeated demands to halt a pre-charge interview or to allow
the suspect’s lawyer to speak with his client.207 Subsequent federal
decisions from Minnesota, however, have distinguished the particular
conduct at issue without deciding whether to adopt Miller’s rejection of a
blanket pre-charge exemption. In one case, the court relied on both
Minnesota and federal precedent to find no violation where a covert
communication concerned the suspect’s efforts to obstruct an upcoming
trial on charged criminal behavior.208 In another case, a federal prosecutor
conducting a pre-charge interview made no effort to keep the interviewees
from consulting a lawyer, and so, the court concluded, even Minnesota state
courts would find no violation on these facts.209 So far at least, Minnesota’s
205. The one post-CPA federal case from Florida to address whether a federal prosecutor had
violated the no-contact rule concluded that a pre-charge interview had nothing to do with the
matter on which the interviewee was represented, so the rule simply did not apply. United States
v. Moss, No. 10-60264-CR-COHN, 2011 WL 2669159, at *7-*8 (S.D. Fla. March 21, 2011).
Interestingly, the court relied on an ABA ethics opinion as support for its interpretation of the rule,
noting that the Florida rule and the Model rule were “virtually the same,” other than Florida’s lack
of an authorized by law exception. Id. at *7 & n.9.
206. In re Doe is cited approvingly in cases applying the no-contact rule to private lawyers,
see NAACP v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2000), as
well as in cases addressing other rules of professional conduct, see, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v.
Premier Election Solutions, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1968-Orl-19KRS, 2010 WL 2243708, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. June 4, 2010); see also Ward v. Nierlich, No. 99-14227-CIV, 2008 WL 511909, at *2 (S.D.
Fla., Feb. 22, 2008) (stating that federal courts should only rely on state court or bar association
decisions “to the extent that they are compatible with federal law and policy” (quoting Grievance
Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995))). Post-CPA decisions from other federal
jurisdictions have made the same point. See, e.g., In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 687 (3d
Cir. 2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 219 F.R.D. 267, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Cavender v. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).
207. State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 466-68 (Minn. 1999) (finding that this “systematic
isolation of the client from his attorney” warranted suppression); see also In re McCormick, 819
N.W.2d 442, 444 (Minn. 2012) (reiterating Miller’s holding that the rule generally permits
“legitimate investigative processes” but prohibits “egregious” prosecutorial conduct); State v.
Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 337-45 (Minn. 2007) (adopting and clarifying Miller’s case-by-case
approach in the context of a post-charge interview).
208. United States v. Petters, No. 08-364(1) RHK/AJB, 2009 WL 1519888, at *8-*9 (D.
Minn. April 28, 2009).
209. United States v. Beliveau, No. 09-304(JMR/JJK), 2010 WL 681257, at *4-*5 (D. Minn.
Feb. 23, 2010).
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Hammad approach has been no more of a constraint in federal court than
Hammad itself proved to be.210
Of course, even if a federal court finds no violation of the no-contact
rule, opposing counsel or a defendant could still refer a federal prosecutor
to state bar authorities for discipline. It is hard to imagine, however, that a
state bar would discipline a federal prosecutor for conduct that federal
courts—the courts where the prosecutor practices—have deemed not to be a
violation. And indeed, there appears to be no post-CPA state case
disciplining or even considering discipline for a federal prosecutor’s
violation of the no-contact rule.211
IV. REASSESSMENT: A GOOD THING IT PASSED, AND A GOOD
THING IT FAILED
From the beginning, the CPA has been the subject of extensive
scholarly criticism. Some commentators have focused on what they
perceive to be the CPA’s failure to deliver on its promise to enforce the nocontact rule against federal prosecutors.212 Others have focused on what
they perceive to be the CPA’s crippling effects on law enforcement as a
result of continuing uncertainty regarding various state interpretations of the
rule.213 Both schools of thought, however, would benefit from a closer
examination of how the no-contact rule has actually been applied to federal
prosecutors in the wake of the CPA.
On the one hand, the CPA accomplished the important goal of
nullifying the ill-conceived system of DOJ self-interpretation of the nocontact rule for federal prosecutors. On the other hand, the CPA did not
accomplish its supporters’ questionable goal of subjecting federal
prosecutors to various state versions of the no-contact rule that might
effectively have nullified the pre-charge investigatory exemption. The
combined result of this mixed record has been a remarkably—if
inadvertently—enduring and coherent framework of no-contact rule
regulation by federal courts.

210. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
211. The pre-CPA In re Howes decision, discussed supra at Part II.B.2, appears to be the only
reported state court decision disciplining a federal prosecutor for a no-contact rule violation.
212. See, e.g., Browdie & Xiang, supra note 1.
213. See, e.g., Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade
Amendment, supra note 71, at 2092-94.
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A. A Good Thing It Passed: DOJ Self-Authorization to Formulate and
Interpret the No-Contact Rule is Nullified
The CPA was a major accomplishment in that it definitively nullified
the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation and, with them, DOJ’s
claim of exclusive authority to formulate and interpret a no-contact rule for
federal prosecutors. The few pre-CPA federal court decisions that
explicitly considered the Memo and the Regulation rejected DOJ’s claim of
authority,214 but whether that trend would have continued is, of course,
unknown. At minimum, the CPA short-circuited what likely would have
been years of litigation over the issue. And had DOJ ultimately prevailed,
the resulting self-regulatory system would have undermined the legitimacy
of the rule itself—even though DOJ’s no-contact rule largely mirrored the
pre-charge investigatory exemption that had been established by federal
court decisions beginning with Lemonakis.
Self-regulation of any profession invites criticism regarding the
purpose and efficacy of self-imposed rules.215 Such rules may serve the
purposes of the profession at the expense of protecting the public. The
rules may be framed in broad generalities that are difficult to enforce to
afford members maximum flexibility. Members may be loath to report
colleagues’ misdeeds due both to personal relationships and to concerns
regarding the status and reputation of the profession as a whole.216 And
regardless of the extent to which these concerns are true in any particular
case, the public may perceive them to be so.217
Many commentators have leveled such criticisms at the legal
profession.218 Rules of professional conduct for lawyers are largely
established and interpreted by bar associations that are comprised of
individuals who are themselves bound by the rules. As demonstrated by

214. See supra Part II.B.3.
215. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could be MisRegulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1990) (questioning self-regulation of the judiciary); Jim
Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115, 124-27 (2010) (fertility clinics); Dennis D.
Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 457-59 (2011) (the internet); Yuwa Wei, Speculation and Regulation: A
Story of China’s Capital Market, 16 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 2007, at 14, 18 (capital
markets).
216. D’Amato refers to this as a “guild” mentality. See D’Amato, supra note 215, at 611.
217. See, e.g., Wei, supra note 215, at 18 (“All of these disadvantages undermine public
confidence in self-regulation.”).
218. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of
Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L. J. 253 (2012); Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code
541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079
(2005); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
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Zacharias, however, the bar association system is in fact subject to
significant external controls.219 State supreme courts, for example, have
ultimate authority over the promulgation and interpretation of bar rules;220
regulatory agencies such as the SEC may impose their own rules of conduct
on the lawyers who appear before them; and state legislators authorize and
can always modify the self-regulatory system.221
Unlike regulation of the broader legal profession, the self-regulatory
system of the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation admitted no
external controls—a position appropriately criticized as “an extraordinary
and alarming assertion of power.”222 Reflecting, perhaps, prosecutors’
“reflexive mistrust of professional regulatory institutions,”223 DOJ accorded
the Attorney General complete discretion over the no-contact rule for
federal prosecutors.224 Although outside input was solicited and considered
at least for the Reno Regulation, DOJ was under no obligation to
incorporate contrary views into its rulemaking.225 And with the Regulation
itself intended to provide sufficient “law” for the “authorized by law”
exception, courts would have had no choice but to approve any
communications that fell within the Regulation’s broad investigatory
exemption. 226

219. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
220. Although judges are lawyers themselves, “judges overseeing lawyers take their
independence from the bar and their regulatory functions seriously,” and thus are appropriately
characterized as an external control on the system. Id. at 1153-54.
221. Id. at 1166-71. Zacharias persuasively argues that this system of co-regulation would—
if it were better understood—generate far greater public confidence in the rules of professional
conduct and in the profession generally. See id. at 1184-86.
222. Dash, supra note 32, at 137; see also Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach
to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 494 (1995) (arguing that the Reno Regulation “takes the concept of
attorney self-regulation to the most extreme manifestation imaginable”).
223. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 904 (2012).
224. See id. at 878.
225. See, e.g., Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,910 (“During the most recent comment
period, the Department received many thoughtful comments from private attorneys, local bar
organizations, state courts, federal prosecutors, and others. The Department closely scrutinized all
of these comments. After considering those comments, the Department made several relatively
minor amendments to the proposed rule.”).
226. Zacharias and Green, in a piece written shortly after the CPA’s passage, suggested that,
ironically, a renewed version of the Reno Regulation or something similar could still provide the
“law” that would trigger the “authorized by law” exception. See Zacharias & Green, supra note
13, at 219 & nn.78-79. DOJ, however, avoided fighting the same battle again and replaced the
Reno Regulation with new regulations that provided guidance on implementation of the CPA
(including, for example, choice of law guidelines) but claimed no specific exemptions from the
no-contact rule or any other rule. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-77.5 (1994).
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The conflict of interest inherent in this particular self-regulatory
scheme is plain. DOJ is judged by many measures. No measure, however,
is more significant than the number of serious crimes that are successfully
discovered and prosecuted.227 The temptation for DOJ, then, is to draft a
no-contact rule that emphasizes law enforcement needs (latitude in
investigations) over the rule’s purpose (protection of the lawyer-client
relationship). And the negative publicity for DOJ that ensues from
prosecutorial misconduct228 further suggests a temptation to craft a
permissive standard that would rarely be violated, as the importance of
public confidence in the nation’s chief law enforcement agency cannot be
overstated.229
DOJ defended the Memo and the Regulation as promoting the highest
ethical standards.230 And CPA proponents surely overstated the case in
asserting that DOJ’s no-contact rule was an affront to fairness, particularly
in light of the fact that DOJ’s rule was so similar to the pre-charge
exemption crafted by federal courts. The fact of the rule coming entirely
from DOJ, however, undermined the rule’s credibility for all of the reasons
that make self-regulation suspect in any arena.231
In one significant way, the CPA had no effect on DOJ’s claim to selfregulation under the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Regulation. One
primary objective of the CPA was to dislodge the disciplinary system from
DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in favor of state
disciplinary authorities.232 As noted above, however, state discipline of
227. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate
Counsel in the World of the Holder Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1199, 1215 (2010) (“the
metric by which success is measured at the DOJ is one’s conviction rate.”). The DOJ website
reflects this understanding with a prominently featured list of the Attorney General’s “top
accomplishments” that highlights DOJ’s successful efforts to investigate and punish serious
crimes, including terrorist threats, drug trafficking, gang violence, and financial fraud. See U. S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/accomplishments/ (last visited June 5, 2013).
228. Federal prosecutors’ failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to Senator Ted
Stevens’s defense team is a recent example of the intense criticism that can follow from wellpublicized professional responsibility failures. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Michael S. Schmidt,
Prosecutors Suspended in ‘08 Trial of a Senator, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, at A22; Del Quentin
Wilber & Sari Horwitz, Report: Prosecutors Hid Evidence in Stevens Case, WASH. POST, March
16, 2012, at A3.
229. See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 3-2.140 (2009) (“The[] professional
abilities [of United States Attorneys] and the need for their impartiality in administering justice
directly affect the public’s perception of federal law enforcement.”).
230. See, e.g., Reno Regulation, supra note 11, at 39,928 (amending 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(a)).
231. See, e.g., Green, supra note 223, at 903 (“Prosecutors’ exaggerated opposition to
professional regulation . . . undermines professional and public confidence in prosecutors.”).
232. See generally Jennifer Blair, Comment, The Regulation of Federal Prosecutorial
Misconduct by State Bar Associations: 28 U.S.C. § 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 625, 638-39 (2001).
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federal prosecutors for violations of the no-contact rule has been virtually
non-existent.233 Backed by substantial evidence, many commentators have
criticized OPR for a lack of objectivity that contributes to inordinately
lengthy investigations and little or no meaningful discipline.234 And,
indeed, although numerous allegations of no-contact rule violations have
been filed with OPR, there is no public record of OPR ever finding a
violation for a pre-charge communication.235
While the CPA certainly has not cracked this rightly-criticized system
of self-discipline, the problem in this regard does not stem from the CPA
itself. Rather, as discussed below, the no-contact rule—appropriately
interpreted to include a broad pre-charge exemption for prosecutors—was
always a poor vehicle to accomplish this goal. Simply stated, federal courts
have continued to endorse a broad pre-charge investigatory exemption,
which makes actual violations of the no-contact rule appropriately rare.
B. A Good Thing It Failed: The Pre-Charge Investigatory Exemption
Endures
The CPA succeeded in wresting control over the wording and
interpretation of the no-contact rule from DOJ. Contrary to expectations,
however, the CPA did not lodge interpretive control with state authorities
nor did it cut back on the pre-charge investigatory exemption for federal
prosecutors. Instead, federal courts effectively remained the primary
regulatory authority, continuing down the same jurisprudential path forged
prior to the CPA, the Reno Regulation, and the Thornburgh Memo, and

233. See supra Part III.B.2.
234. See, e.g, ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 159 (Oxford U. Press 2007) (“[T]he risk of actual and perceived bias in the
decision-making process is high when [,as is true for OPR,] the ultimate decision-makers have a
vested interest in demonstrating that most of its prosecutors do not engage in misconduct.”);
Brendan Sullivan, Opinion, No Justice for Reckless Prosecutors, WASH. POST, July 6, 2012, at
A15 (“The underlying misconduct [in DOJ’s prosecution of Sen. Ted Stevens] represents a
shameful chapter in the Justice Department’s history. But the department’s failure to punish
wrongdoers makes the scandal worse, and the failure makes a mockery of the attorney general’s
effort to establish a standard of propriety that the goal of prosecutors is to do justice, not to win at
all costs.”).
235. OPR annual reports are available online for the years 1994 through 2011. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.justice.gov/opr/
reports.htm. (last visited June 5, 2013). The reports are somewhat cryptic, providing summary
examples of OPR investigations and disciplinary recommendations rather than a comprehensive
reckoning of all OPR cases. These reports include only one instance, involving a post-charge
communication, where OPR found that a federal prosecutor violated the no-contact rule. See
Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Report, 2005 Ann. Rep., Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal
Year 2005, ex. 11.
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notwithstanding the momentary panic generated by Hammad.236 The
CPA’s “failure” to achieve its proponents’ goals in this regard has resulted
in a coherent and consistent pre-charge exemption that appropriately limits
constraints on federal prosecutors.
Scholarship assessing the CPA during the first couple of years after
passage tended to reiterate the central fallacy of the legislative debate—that
federal prosecutors would have to follow different no-contact rules in
different states and that the various states would impose significant
constraints on federal prosecutors’ involvement in pre-charge
communications.237 These assumptions permeated the literature regardless
of the author’s ultimate assessment of the law. Khatiwala, for example,
praised the CPA as “the best solution” to ensure that federal prosecutors
“comply” with the no-contact rule.238 Radack, on the other hand, criticized
the CPA as literally “costing lives” because of the chilling effect that
enforcing the various state versions of the no-contact rule would have on
federal prosecutors’ investigation of serious crimes.239
Not surprisingly, critics of DOJ’s investigatory tactics quickly became
disillusioned with the CPA. Davis, for example, foresaw that, among other
issues, the CPA’s lack of clarity rendered it unlikely to “have any
significant effect” on prosecutorial practice.240 The CPA’s requirement that
federal prosecutors follow state rules did not prescribe the specific type of
conduct that would be prohibited. From the perspective of the no-contact
rule, the CPA compelled compliance with the whole rule, which included
the “authorized by law” exception, and—with that—the federal courts’ precharge investigatory exemption. This school of thought, then, criticized—
and continues to criticize—the CPA as a missed opportunity to curb what is
characterized as rampant prosecutorial misconduct.241

236. See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
237. See supra Part III.A.
238. Khatiwala, supra note 158, at 112-13; see also, e.g., Jennifer Marie Buettner,
Compromising Professionalism: The Justice Department’s Anti-Contact Rule, 23 J. LEGAL PROF.
121 (1999); David Halperin, Ethics Breakthrough or Ethics Breakdown? Kenneth Starr’s Dual
Roles as Private Practitioner and Public Prosecutor, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 231, 273 & n.182
(2002).
239. Radack, supra note 162, at 707; see also, e.g., Douglass, supra note 147, at 142-43;
Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, supra note 71,
at 2015-24.
240. Davis, supra note 2, at 460.
241. See, e.g., id. at 399 (arguing that the CPA “will not control prosecutorial power
adequately”); Alfredo Garcia, “No Fetish” for Privacy, Fairness, or Justice: Why William
Rehnquist, Not Ken Starr, Was Responsible for William Jefferson Clinton’s Impeachment, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 573 (2001) (disagreeing with scholars who viewed the CPA as a
“promising start[] in efforts to curb or deter misconduct by federal prosecutors”); Browdie &
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Somewhat more surprisingly, scholars favoring wide latitude for
prosecutors under the no-contact rule also criticized—and continue to
criticize—the CPA. Congress intended federal prosecutors to be subject to
the various state interpretations of the no-contact rule, and thus, according
to this school of thought, the concern remains that disparate state
interpretations may negate the pre-charge exemption, at least in some
jurisdictions. Moreover, even the mere possibility of federal prosecutors
being subjected to conflicting state rules is enough—it is argued—to chill
any prudent prosecutor’s willingness to brave the uncertain landscape and
forge ahead with investigatory communications that might violate some
state’s rule.242
The widespread criticism of the CPA has shaped the academic
literature, with commentary tending to focus on identifying and solving the
“problem” of how to apply the no-contact rule to federal prosecutors.
Depending on the observer’s perspective, the solution might be to promote
maximum prosecutorial flexibility by broadening the pre-charge
exemption.243 Or the solution might be to better protect the criminal
defense lawyer-client relationship by limiting the pre-charge exemption.244
Xiang, supra note 1, at 696 (arguing that the CPA did not prevent DOJ from “continu[ing] to
circumvent ethics rules”); William H. Edmonson, Note, A “New” No-Contact Rule: Proposing an
Addition to the No-Contact Rule to Address Questioning of Suspects After Unreasonable
Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1773, 1781-83 (2005) (arguing that contrary to
Congressional intent, “courts have generally refused to enforce the no-contact rule against
prosecutors” in the pre-charge phase); Jackie Lu, Note, How Terror Changed Justice: A Call to
Reform Safeguards that Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 377, 382
(2006) (arguing that the CPA is “insufficient to prevent misconduct in terrorism cases”); Cline,
supra note 34, at 34 (arguing that the CPA did not end federal prosecutors’ unfair exemption from
the no-contact rule).
242. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 147, at 135 (“Under the CPA, a federal prosecutor might
be subject simultaneously to the ethical rules of a host of states.”); Hazard & Irwin, supra note 2,
at 809-10 (arguing that although the various state versions of the no-contact rule are virtually
identical, “differences in judicial interpretations may, in fact, pose problems of conflicting
guidance”); Henning, supra note 2, at 59 (“Perhaps the greatest problem with the [CPA] is the
lack of uniformity in ethical rules for the profession.”); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)utility of
Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 16 (2005)
(arguing that the CPA “leav[es] the prosecutor subject to potentially conflicting rules”); Frederick
M. Morgan, Jr., Of Third Rails and Rabbit Trails: The “No-Contact” Rule and the McDade
Amendment in Qui Tam Lawsuits, 37 FALSE CL. ACT AND QUI TAM Q. REV. 14, 26 (2005)
(arguing that the uncertainty generated by the CPA continues to have an “in terrorem” chilling
effect on federal prosecutors); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 821-22 (2003) (arguing that the CPA and its “unreflective
application of [state] ethical rules governing investigations to prosecutors” is a “step[] in the
wrong direction”); Tennis, supra note 72, at 153 (arguing that the CPA “hinders the ability of a
federal prosecutor to determine which ethical regulations govern his conduct”).
243. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 147.
244. See Hazard & Irwin, supra note 2, at 804.
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Or the solution might simply be to codify some unified federal standard
regardless of which side it favors, in order to remove the alleged
uncertainties of state-by-state enforcement.245 The one point of agreement
among the pile of proposals is that reform is badly needed.246
With the advantage of fifteen years’ hindsight since passage of the
CPA, it is time to reconsider the urge to fix something that isn’t broken.
The rejoinder to both camps of criticism is by reference to how federal
prosecutors have actually fared under the CPA. First, most pre-charge
communications simply do not violate or circumvent the rule—they
legitimately fall within the rule’s “authorized by law” exception. Second,
federal courts have shown no willingness to be bound by conflicting state
interpretations of the no-contact rule nor is there any indication of a
brewing shift in this regard. The most significant lesson from the CPA’s
failure to affect no-contact rule practice is that the federal courts have
gotten it right.
The continued authority of federal courts—rather than various local bar
associations and state courts—is appropriate for no-contact rule issues.
Concerns by DOJ and other CPA opponents regarding state-by-state
uncertainties were overblown, but not unfounded.
State court
interpretations have largely followed federal courts in adopting a broad precharge investigatory exemption. However, as seen, for example, in Florida
and Minnesota,247 federal prosecutors—if forced to follow local
interpretations—could face a contradictory array of rules applying to
otherwise identical aspects of the same investigation. Federal courts have
rightly recognized their role as a bulwark against the “balkanization” of
professional standards for federal criminal investigations.248
Second, federal courts have come to the right conclusion regarding the
parameters of the no-contact rule. The broad and clear pre-charge
investigatory exemption for covert communications is particularly wellsuited for the “authorized by law” exception. Undercover operations have

245. See, e.g., John H. Lim, Note, The Side Effects of a Legal Ethics Panacea: Revealing a
United States’ Standing Committee’s Proposal to “Standardize” Ethics Rules in the Courts as an
Attempt to Undermine the No-Contact Rule, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (2000).
246. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 147, at 140-49; Hazard & Irwin, supra note 2, at 816-18;
McMorrow, supra note 242, at 16; Henning, supra note 2, at 60; Christopher R. Smith, I Fought
the Law and the Law Lost: The Case for Congressional Oversight over Systemic Department of
Justice Discovery Abuse in Criminal Cases, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 85, 99-100
(2010); Zacharias & Green, supra note 15, at 259-61; Browdie & Xiang, supra note 1, at 696;
Edmonson, supra note 241, at 1787-89; Lim, supra note 245, at 572-74; Tennis, supra note 72, at
182.
247. See supra Part III.B.2.
248. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995).
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long been recognized as appropriate and, indeed, are “frequently essential to
the enforcement of the law.”249 Agents are expected to engage in such
communications regardless of whether a suspect is represented by counsel.
The most immediate and obvious effect of prohibiting or even partly
prohibiting prosecutors’ involvement is that agents would simply proceed
without the benefit of legal advice—not just as to the propriety of the
communication itself but potentially also as to the legality or advisability of
related matters including, for example, search warrants and electronic
surveillance techniques.250
Nor do covert communications contradict the underlying goal of the
rule, which is to protect the lawyer-client relationship from undue
interference by another lawyer. Covert communications certainly may
result in the suspect saying or doing something that the suspect’s lawyer
would have advised against. But there is no reason that a covert
communication necessarily or unduly undermines a suspect’s relationship
with his or her lawyer. And even if the prosecutor provides specific
instructions for the undercover agent or cooperator, it is not as though
anything worse—anything trickier or more nefarious—has happened
beyond what the agent could simply do on his or her own.251 If anything,
the particular group most protected by the rule—relatively well-to-do
criminal suspects who have been advised by counsel—may be the least
susceptible to government trickery.252
The “authorized by law” exception should as a general matter include
overt communications for the same reasons.253 Agents are not bound by the
no-contact rule, so all that carving out overt communications from the
exemption would do is incentivize agents to not consult counsel. On the
249. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) (“The appropriate object” of
undercover investigation “is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the
prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses,
and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.”); see also, e.g., Jacobson v. United States,
503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992).
250. See, e.g., In re Amgen, Inc., No. 10–MC–0249, 2011 WL 2442047, at *8 n.14 (E.D.N.Y.
April 6, 2011) (“Because [the no-contact rule] regulates only attorneys and does nothing to
constrain law enforcement agents acting as such, Amgen’s broad interpretation of the no-contact
rule would do nothing to reduce the government’s ability to make contacts with investigative
subjects—it would simply give the government a perverse incentive to have those contacts take
place without an opportunity for prosecutors to ensure that they occur within the bounds of the
law.”) (citation omitted).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States
v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996)); United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir.
1993).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Binder Schweitzer Emblem Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 862, 865-67
(E.D.N.C. 2001).

2.SIROTA.ARTICLE.MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

94

S OU TH WES TER N LA W REVIE W

2/28/2014 4:28 PM

[Vol. 43

other hand, some degree of coercion is inherent—and inherently
troublesome—in any interview with a government agent. The “interview”
may quickly come to resemble an interrogation with no option of leaving or
choosing not to answer the government’s questions. Federal courts are
right to tread carefully here, and to draw the line at least by the time that the
communication turns to the possibility of forfeiting the suspect’s legal
rights, as with negotiations for immunity or a plea arrangement.254
Inherent in any common law scheme is some measure of uncertainty.
Inevitably situations will arise—most likely in the overt context—where a
prosecutor is not sure whether a communication violates the no-contact
rule.
The extent to which pre-charge overt communications by
prosecutors—or, indeed, by non-lawyer government agents—should be
allowed is a subject ripe for further investigation and analysis. In the
meantime, however, the rule permits a prosecutor to seek a court order in
such situations.255 Though impractical on a regular basis, seeking a court
order is a reasonable inconvenience for the occasional case where the
parameters of the no-contact rule remain unclear.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Hammad decision, the Thornburgh Memo, the Reno
Regulation, nor even the CPA itself ultimately upset the coherent, uniform,
and remarkably durable pre-charge investigatory exemption for prosecutors
established by federal courts beginning with the Lemonakis decision. The
pre-charge exemption, which is now clearly recognized as falling within the
rule’s own “authorized by law” provision, has allowed federal prosecutors
to supervise and provide legal counsel for criminal investigations,
unimpeded by whether or not the suspect is able to retain a lawyer before
charging. The exemption appropriately provides broad discretion in the
context of covert communications and, also appropriately, more constrained
discretion in the potentially coercive context of overt communications.
The CPA succeeded in nullifying DOJ’s ill-conceived claim of
exclusive interpretive authority over the no-contact rule for its own lawyers.
The CPA failed to accomplish its proponents’ ill-conceived goal of limiting
federal involvement in pre-charge investigative communications with
represented persons. The combined success and failure of the CPA have

254. See, e.g., United States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360, 365-66 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
255. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (excepting communications
“authorized” by “a court order”); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
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left us with a system of regulatory control that—for this particular issue—
works.

